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Joseph F. Jennings**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1989 the Army and the other Services have been participating in the "war on drugs" by providing equipment, training, intelligence data, operational support, transportation, and other services to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs). With increasing public pressure to control illegal drug use, and with decreasing defense budgets, the Army has recognized the need to effectively and efficiently manage Army resources allocated to the counterdrug mission.

The Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate (LICPD) of the Army's Combined Arms Command (CAC) has taken the lead in defining Army counterdrug roles and missions. LICPD tasked The MITRE Corporation to conduct a Front End Analysis (FEA) as the first in a series of studies intended to:

- Define Army roles and missions for counterdrug activities,
- Determine changes needed in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel to position the Army better for its counterdrug mission, and
- Develop a rationale for the efficient and, where appropriate, cost-effective allocation of Army resources to the counterdrug effort.

This report presents the purpose, findings, and recommendations of that FEA. The FEA's principal objectives were (1) to develop a comprehensive list of the support requirements of LEAs in the continental United States (CONUS) and of corresponding law enforcement officials outside CONUS (OCONUS), and (2) to develop a list of Army capabilities that can help meet those requirements.

This report matches the LEA requirements with Army capabilities. Note, however, that the information available to MITRE about OCONUS counterdrug activities was less detailed than that available for CONUS activities. A comprehensive list of OCONUS counterdrug requirements will require additional research.

The report also presents some general findings that MITRE developed while collecting data. These findings are:

- The Army has the capabilities and resources to meet most of the types of LEA requirements identified in this FEA.
- Many LEAs, particularly the smaller ones, are unaware of the support that could be available to them and do not know how to identify or request it.
- Many LEA officials are frustrated with the responses of the Services to LEA requests for support.

- There is a need for continued “cross-cultural” education for both the LEAs and the Services to enhance communication, understanding, and cooperation between their diverse communities.
- Current policy and legal restrictions significantly affect the types of support that can be provided and the timeliness of the support that is allowed.

On the basis of findings that relate directly to the FEA objectives, MITRE recommends that the Army undertake the following:

- Develop and implement a more “pro-active” approach to informing the LEA community about the support the Army can provide and the ways to obtain that support,
- Collect additional data to determine more completely the OCONUS support requirements and to match Army capabilities and resources to those requirements, and
- Conduct follow-on studies, starting with the results of this FEA, to prioritize CONUS and OCONUS support requirements and determine the relative effectiveness of Army resources and capabilities. These studies could include a cost-benefit analysis and a business re-engineering analysis. The objectives of the studies would be to support:
 - Long-range planning for doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and materiel acquisition,
 - Developing procedures that allocate Army resources to achieve the greatest impact on the national counterdrug goals, and
 - Developing procedures to determine which LEA requests to support when demands for support exceed available resources.

The report also discusses other issues that arose during the FEA. That discussion provides insights that can help determine the course of future Army counterdrug support. In particular, the report describes how the Army can enhance counterdrug support by:

- Taking the lead on behalf of the Services to examine alternatives to the current process by which support is provided to LEAs, with the purpose of improving the timeliness and effectiveness of the support provided; and
- Taking the lead on behalf of the Services to conduct a legal review of all policies within DOD relevant to providing support for counterdrug activities, with the purpose of ensuring that DOD policies are as pro-active as possible, while still providing the necessary legal safeguards.

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

In September 1989, the President announced a "National Drug Control Strategy" that defined a set of national priorities and goals for combating the domestic sale and use of illegal drugs. In response to this strategy, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) issued his initial guidance to the Armed Services on their participation in the war on drugs. Since that time, the Services, and the Army in particular, have provided equipment, training, intelligence data, operational support, transportation, and other services to civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs).

Nevertheless, widespread use of illegal drugs continues. With increasing pressure from the public to control this threat, and with decreasing defense budgets, the Army has recognized the need to manage effectively and efficiently Army assets allocated to this mission. To that end, Army management must define appropriate Army roles and missions in the counterdrug effort and determine how best to perform those roles.

The Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate (LICPD) of the Army's Combined Arms Command (CAC) has taken the lead in defining the Army's counterdrug roles and missions. LICPD is also responsible for determining changes needed in Army doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel to better position the Army for its counterdrug mission.

As a first step in the process of defining Army roles and missions, LICPD tasked The MITRE Corporation to conduct a Front End Analysis (FEA) of Army counterdrug roles and missions. This report presents the purpose, findings, and recommendations of that FEA.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE ANALYSIS

Several things needed to be accomplished to allow LICPD to perform the tasks described above. First, the mission requirements had to be understood. Since the Army is in a support position in this "war," the needs of the law enforcement community define those requirements. Second, an assessment of resources and capabilities available to meet the requirements had to be conducted. The results of these tasks would provide a basis for identifying additional needs of the Army and for conducting further study to determine how to allocate Army resources.

The purpose of the FEA was to perform the first two tasks described above. The FEA had two particular objectives:

- (1) To compile a comprehensive list of the requirements of LEAs in the Continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS), and

- (2) To develop a preliminary list of Army capabilities, both operational and non-operational, that could be provided to meet LEA requirements.¹

1.2 SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS

The initial scope of the FEA was very broad. The goal was to examine the CONUS and OCONUS support requirements of all LEAs involved in the drug war and to match to those requirements the support capabilities of the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Section 3 discusses the time and resource constraints that required limiting the scope of the analysis. The sponsor and MITRE jointly selected representative sets of LEAs and Army organizations on which to focus the analysis.

The following criteria were used to select LEAs for participation in the study:

- (1) The LEA must be actively involved in counterdrug operations.
- (2) Collectively, the set of LEAs chosen must cover the range of the analysis (CONUS, OCONUS, federal, state, and local).
- (3) The geographic locations of the set of LEAs chosen must be diverse.

Army representatives were chosen on the basis of their experience in counterdrug support and their knowledge of Army resources and capabilities.

1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

This remainder of this report contains four sections and supporting appendixes, as described below:

- (1) Section 2 describes the context of the FEA by providing background information on the history of the drug problem in the United States, along with the response of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the counterdrug role of LICPD.
- (2) Section 3 describes the approach used to conduct the FEA. This section also discusses the FEA limitations and constraints and their effects on the analysis.
- (3) Section 4 presents the FEA findings. Besides findings that concern the FEA objectives directly, MITRE obtained information on interactions between the Army and the law enforcement community. Since these additional findings could have a significant impact on decisions that the Army must make on future counterdrug activities, MITRE included this information in section 4.

¹ The FEA Statement of Work (SOW) includes a third objective: to relate LEA requirements to the national drug control goals they support. MITRE and the sponsor determined jointly that this objective is more appropriate for the follow-on work planned for FY93.

- (4) Section 5 provides conclusions and recommendations based on all the FEA findings.
- (5) Appendix A lists the analysis participants.
- (6) Appendix B lists the CONUS LEA tasks.
- (7) Appendix C lists courses taught at the U.S. Army Military Police School that are relevant to LEA counterdrug activities.

SECTION 2

BACKGROUND

To understand the objectives of the FEA and the approach used in the analysis, it is necessary first to understand the drug problem and why the Army has become involved in its solution. This section provides a brief overview of the effects of illicit drug use in the U.S. and the responses to that problem by the DoD and, in particular, the Army.

2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG PROBLEM

Illegal drug use has been a part of American society for many years. The drugs of choice have included marijuana, opium, heroin, cocaine and, more recently, manufactured drugs such as methamphetamine and LSD. The problems associated with this drug use—such as increases in crime, lowered productivity, and increased health and welfare costs—have long been a concern. However, it was not until the mid-1980s, with the introduction by the Colombian drug cartels of “crack” cocaine, that drug use began to be seen as a major national problem. Because “crack” is both potent and relatively inexpensive, it has led the way in the recent, unprecedented spread of drug abuse in the U.S. The statistics below illustrate the extent of the current drug abuse problem.²

- During 1989, an estimated 25 million Americans, about one in ten, used some form of illegal drug at least once.³
- Annually, more than 200,000 babies are born to mothers who are using illegal drugs.⁴
- Intravenous drug use is now the largest source of new HIV/AIDS infections, and half of all AIDS deaths may be drug-related.
- Emergency room admissions that are drug-related increased 120 percent between 1985 and 1989.
- Annually, over \$150 billion flows to drug dealers, and an additional \$60 to \$80 billion are lost through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, lowered productivity, and added medical expenses.⁵

² Munger and Mendel, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*, U.S. Army War College, February 1991, p 1.

³ National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), “The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States,” Washington: June 1990, p 54.

⁴ George Bush, “National Drug Control Strategy,” Washington, The White House 5 September, 1989, pp 1-2.

⁵ Bush, p 2, modified as a result of recent interviews with drug LEA officials.

2.2 THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM

At varying levels of intensity, a war on drugs has been fought for as long as illegal drugs have been a part of our society. As the drug problem began to escalate in the 1960s, so did the efforts to control or eliminate illegal drug use. When the problem exploded into a national crisis in the 1980s, the need for a national-level counterdrug effort became apparent. In 1989, the President stated, "America's fight against illegal drug use cannot be won on any single front alone; it must be waged everywhere—at every level of Federal, State, and local government."⁶ The Bush administration published the first *National Drug Control Strategy* in September 1989. This strategy defined a set of national priorities and specified a set of goals or objectives for measuring progress.

2.3 THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The *National Drug Control Strategy* tasked federal agencies to develop plans to support the attack on drugs described above. Within two weeks, the DoD published its guidance for implementation of the national strategy. In this document, the SecDef stated that, "... the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense."⁷ The DoD guidance established a strategy for disrupting the flow of illegal drugs. The three elements of this strategy are as follows:

- (1) Attack drugs at their source. This element focuses on drugs (principally heroin and cocaine) grown or produced outside the United States. DoD attacks the supply of drugs in source countries in three ways: (1) by providing assistance for nation-building, (2) by providing operational support to host-country forces, and (3) by cooperating with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. The guidance further states that, "... U.S. Armed Forces can provide foreign forces substantial assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support, and civic action in connection with foreign forces' operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises."
- (2) Attack drugs in transit from source countries into the United States. DoD is the lead agency in the federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. One of the key roles of DoD in this area is the integration of the myriad command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) resources employed by DoD and civilian law enforcement into an effective C³I network.
- (3) Attack drugs in the United States. This element includes efforts to reduce both the supply of and demand for drugs in this country. These include drugs grown or produced in the U.S.: marijuana, amphetamines, and manufactured hallucinogens.

⁶ Bush, letter to The Honorable Thomas S. Foley, dated 5 September 1989.

⁷ Cheney, Richard, "Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy," Washington, D.C., 18 September 1989, p 1.

DoD's participation emphasizes support for Federal, State, and local LEAs, and for the National Guard in State status. DoD assists requesting LEAs and the National Guard with training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counterdrug operations. Unique to this element of the attack on drugs is the statement that, "In appropriate cases, armed forces personnel and equipment will be detailed directly to law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight."

2.4 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The Army actively supports all three elements of DoD's role in the National Drug Control Strategy. The Army Counternarcotics Plan, published in April 1990, outlines the actions the Army will take to implement the DoD guidance. The key elements of the Army plan are the following:

- (1) The Army will be prepared to: (a) provide forces to combatant commanders and to assist them in developing and executing plans to effectively employ the unique capabilities of Army forces, and (b) provide operational support, equipment, training, and personnel to other U.S. government agencies and, through security assistance, to selected foreign governments to counter drug production, trafficking, and use.
- (2) The Army will act unilaterally in counterdrug operations only in drug abuse prevention and treatment, and in law enforcement or security matters on Army installations.
- (3) National Guard forces will normally conduct counterdrug operations under State control. However, the National Guard can also conduct counterdrug operations in a Federal status under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
- (4) The Army will apply its research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) resources to help LEAs resolve critical technical requirements.
- (5) Support to cooperating foreign governments will be provided through the appropriate Commander in Chief (CINC), in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act and other applicable legislation.
- (6) While executing assigned missions, Army forces will be in support of law enforcement operations and all support will be conducted within existing legal constraints (emphasis added).

The Army Counternarcotics Plan makes it clear that the Army's role in the war on drugs differs significantly from its roles in other, more conventional, wars. In fighting drugs, the Army is a supporting organization precluded by law and policy from taking a direct role in law enforcement activities. Given the unique nature of this relatively new mission, it would not be surprising to discover that accomplishing this mission will require the Army to make adjustments to the ways it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. That is the rationale behind LICPD's efforts.

2.5 THE ROLE OF THE ARMY COUNTERDRUG PROPONENCY OFFICE

The CAC Commander is the Army's specified proponent for low-intensity conflict (LIC). In this role, he is responsible for recommending to the Army leadership concepts, doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel to support the Army's participation in LIC. The CAC Commander has established LICPD as his agent for carrying out this responsibility. LICPD comprises three sections: an Army proponent for Low Intensity Conflict, an Army proponent for Combating Terrorism, and the Army Counterdrug Proponency Office. The mission of the counterdrug proponent is, "To assist the Army Leadership to produce an Army that routinely addresses its mission requirements in the counterdrug environment with the diligence given to its war fighting mission."

As discussed previously, the counterdrug proponent has determined that a necessary first step in accomplishing its mission is to identify the appropriate counterdrug support roles for the Army. The results of this FEA, summarized in this report, are the first step in a series of studies needed to produce a prioritized list of Army counterdrug roles.

SECTION 3

APPROACH

The FEA was conducted in three phases. Phase I involved collecting information from LEA personnel in selected locations throughout the U.S. to develop a list of requirements for CONUS counterdrug support. In Phase II, MITRE gathered information from Army subject-matter experts to identify resources and capabilities that could meet LEA CONUS requirements. Phase III activities centered on defining the support requirements of OCONUS LEAs (specifically in U.S. Southern Command's [SOUTHCOM's] Area of Responsibility [AOR]) and the Army resources that are being provided for those efforts. Sections 3.1 through 3.3 discuss in further detail the approach used to perform these activities. Those sections also discuss FEA limitations and constraints and their effects.

3.1 PHASE I

One of the principal objectives of the FEA was to develop as comprehensive a list as possible of the counterdrug support requirements of the law enforcement community in CONUS. To define requirements for military support, an LEA would need to possess an unlikely degree of knowledge about military capabilities. This difficulty was circumvented by asking LEAs to list their own counterdrug tasks. MITRE then defined a support requirement as a need for support for an LEA counterdrug task and assumed that every LEA task was a candidate for Army support. MITRE used a worksheet and personal and telephone interviews with law enforcement personnel to gather information on LEA tasks.

For the worksheet, MITRE compiled a preliminary list of LEA counterdrug tasks. That list was based on a study conducted by the FBI⁸, on a database of counterdrug support provided by U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM)⁹, and on a previous MITRE study.¹⁰ The list comprised seven categories of tasks, selected to parallel the Army's staff functional areas: administrative (G-1); intelligence (G-2); operational (G-3); logistics (G-4); command, control, and communications (C³) (G-3); special tasks (G-1); and training (G-3).

While developing the worksheet, MITRE also worked closely with the sponsor to identify a representative sample of LEA personnel to participate in the analysis. MITRE then distributed the worksheet to the more-than-300 LEA individuals and agencies identified.

LEA personnel who participated in this analysis included representatives of police departments, sheriff's offices, state narcotics enforcement agencies, federal counterdrug

⁸ *State and Local Law Enforcement Training Needs*, Institutional Research and Development Unit, Training Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Quantico, VA, December 1987.

⁹ Maintained by the counterdrug section of the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) Current Operations, Drugs (ODD).

¹⁰ *A Preliminary Report on the Development of Measures for Evaluation of Army Counterdrug Support*, MITRE Corporation, February 1992 (SECRET).

LEAs, and multi-agency task forces. These persons work in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, the Ft. Lauderdale and Miami areas in Florida, and the Sacramento and Los Angeles areas in California. The agencies represented perform a wide range of counterdrug activities: from high-level investigations of organized crime and money laundering to arrests of dealers on the street and marijuana growers in national forests. These agencies operate in a wide variety of environments—from dense urban areas to remote mountain forests—and face the full spectrum of the drug threat within the United States. (Appendix A lists all the CONUS and OCONUS agencies visited, both military and civilian and both CONUS and OCONUS.)

MITRE asked the recipients of the worksheet to review the tasks listed and, for each category, refine or expand the list to reflect their knowledge and experience of the needs of law enforcement. In addition, we asked them to prioritize the tasks in order of importance to their particular jobs.¹¹ Completed worksheets were either mailed to MITRE or collected during subsequent personal interviews. MITRE was able to interview more than 40 LEA representatives directly involved in counterdrug activities. Collection and compilation of more than 100 completed worksheets, together with notes from the interviews, resulted in:

- (1) Developing extensive list of LEA counterdrug tasks in CONUS, and
- (2) Obtaining additional relevant information on the support needs of the LEA community, including the identification of problems and constraints associated with military-LEA interactions in counterdrug activities.

Limitations of this phase of the analysis include: (1) the availability of responses from only one High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)—Miami,¹² and (2) the lack of LEA representation from rural and other sparsely populated areas. For the following reasons, MITRE believes that these limitations did not seriously affect the FEA findings: (1) the responses from worksheets and interviews were remarkably consistent, despite differences in geographic location and counterdrug goals; and (2) the responses added only a few tasks to the preliminary list, and (3) only a few respondents marked any task for deletion. The major differences between the respondents were in the relative importance they placed on the various tasks. Those differences do not affect the results of this FEA.

The limitations discussed do not allow the claim that MITRE has performed the comprehensive study of support requirements called for in the FEA objectives. However, the uniformity of the responses and the variety of counterdrug activities performed by the agencies included in the analysis do support the claim that the list of support requirements developed is representative of the needs of LEAs in the United States.

¹¹ The results of this prioritization will be used in a later cost-benefit analysis.

¹² HIDTA can be used to refer to both a geographical area and to an organization with responsibilities in that area; we visited three HIDTA areas (Los Angeles, Southwest Border Area, and Miami), but only one HIDTA organization.

3.2 PHASE II

The objective of this phase was to compile a list of Army capabilities and resources that could at least potentially meet the requirements identified in Phase I. The resources available did not permit visiting all types of Army subject-matter experts to obtain this information. MITRE and the sponsor therefore decided to limit Army participants to those with extensive knowledge about Army resources or with experience in counterdrug support.

MITRE and the sponsor jointly selected representatives of Army schools and centers as the principal sources of information on Army capabilities and resources. As proponents for their respective branches, the schools and centers are responsible for informing the Army leadership of their branches' capabilities and requirements for each mission assigned. We concluded that they would be most likely to be knowledgeable about the capabilities and resources that each branch could apply to the counterdrug effort. We could not visit all the schools and centers for personal interviews; therefore, we selected the ones whose branches have been the most active in providing counterdrug support. Those branches were Infantry, Military Police, Signal Corps, Intelligence, and Aviation.

MITRE also interviewed personnel at FORSCOM Headquarters and at three of the Continental United States Army Commands (CONUSAs). The counterdrug cells at FORSCOM and the CONUSAs are responsible for approving and monitoring all requests for Army counterdrug support in CONUS. These cells have dealt with the problem of finding appropriate support resources for the full spectrum of support requests; they proved to be very knowledgeable about Army counterdrug support capabilities.

Upon completion of Phase I—the compilation of LEA counterdrug tasks—MITRE conducted a Video-Teleconference (VTC) with the Army representatives described above to explain the purposes of the analysis and to solicit their participation. For their internal distribution and completion, the VTC participants received a package containing (1) background information, (2) the preliminary list of LEA counterdrug tasks, (3) a preliminary list of Army capabilities and resources, and (4) worksheets for listing additional Army capabilities and resources. MITRE constructed the preliminary list of Army capabilities and resources by using information extracted from a database maintained at ODCSOPS ODD.¹³

The recipients were asked to review the material provided, evaluate the LEA tasks listed, and, with the aid of the preliminary list of capabilities, provide an inventory of all known Army capabilities and resources that might be used to meet the needs of the LEAs. MITRE encouraged these military experts to expand their responses beyond their knowledge of Army support that had already been provided. Although current law and policy prohibit certain activities by the Army in counterdrug efforts, interpretations of constraints may change, and MITRE wanted to allow for all possible scenarios of future Army support. MITRE then visited selected participants to collect completed forms and other relevant information.

The results of Phase II include an extensive list of Army support resources and capabilities, organized into the following four categories: operational; non-operational;

¹³ As part of a related effort, MITRE assisted ODD in the development of this database.

infrastructure development; and research, development, and acquisition. Section 4.2 gives our definitions of these categories.

MITRE believes that our inability to visit all Army subject-matter experts did not significantly affect the analysis findings. This belief is based on favorable comments by interviewees on the completeness of the preliminary list of support capabilities. Since the number of capabilities added by respondents was small compared to the total number of capabilities identified, we believe that the preliminary list was nearly exhaustive. As with the LEA tasks, we cannot claim that the list of Army capabilities is comprehensive, but we are confident that we have identified the major areas in which the Army can assist law enforcement in the war on drugs.

For each of the seven categories of support tasks, MITRE then matched Army capabilities and resources to LEA tasks. Tables 4.1 through 4.16 (in section 4 of this report) show the matches.

3.3 PHASE III

The purpose of Phase III was to identify LEA OCONUS support requirements and Army OCONUS support capabilities. Limitations on this part of the analysis did not permit using the extensive interviewing approach of the first two phases. Fortunately, there was an alternative source of data. During fiscal year 1992, MITRE helped ODCSOPS ODD create a database to assist in collecting and analyzing information on Army counterdrug support provided in the SOUTHCOM AOR. We searched that database to determine the amounts and types of support provided to countries in SOUTHCOM during a recent 18-month period. This information was augmented by a series of informal interviews conducted with LEA and military officials at the SOUTHCOM J-3 counterdrug division, at the United States Army South (USARSO) counterdrug division, and with the Country Team (CT) at the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia.

The results of Phase III were:

- (1) A description of OCONUS support requirements and Army support capabilities that, although it cannot be considered comprehensive, illustrates the range and variety of counterdrug support provided in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
- (2) A set of additional findings on the process by which military support in general, and Army support in particular, is provided OCONUS.

Geography, politics and weather combined to impose severe limitations on the time available to collect data on OCONUS counterdrug operations. First, the area to be investigated—the world outside the United States—was clearly too large for a study such as this FEA. One of our first decisions, made with concurrence of the sponsor, was to limit the OCONUS part of the FEA to the SOUTHCOM AOR. Even this area was far too large to cover in detail. We focused our efforts on the counterdrug cells at SOUTHCOM headquarters and USARSO in Panama—representing the OCONUS support providers—and on the country teams in the embassies in Bolivia, Columbia and Peru—representing the

support recipients. Even this plan was partly frustrated by constraints due to unsettled political situations in the countries we wanted to visit. We could not obtain permission from the embassies to visit Columbia or Peru. The time required to receive clearances to visit Panama and Bolivia, and travel delays caused by hurricane Andrew, limited data collection at those locations to two days each.

As noted above, our access to the SOUTHCOM support database at ODCSOPS ODD mitigated the limitations imposed on this part of the FEA. This database became the primary source for OCONUS support requirements and capabilities. The results of interviews supported and expanded the database information. Although we believe that we have identified major areas of OCONUS support requirements, the CONUS requirements and capabilities clearly have a better information base. We believe that the conclusions drawn in section 5 about OCONUS support requirements and capabilities represent a good start. A comprehensive study of this complex problem area would require a much greater level of effort.

SECTION 4

FINDINGS

4.1 CATEGORIZATION OF FINDINGS

The FEA produced three sets of findings. The first two sets—the LEA support requirements and the Army counterdrug support capabilities and resources—were generated in direct response to the two FEA objectives. These findings, and the conclusions and recommendations based upon them and presented in the next section, constitute the FEA results specified in the SOW. This report refers to the third set of findings as “Additional Findings.” These are a synthesis of comments received from interviewees. Although these additional findings do not relate directly to the FEA objectives, they may have a significant impact on the way the Army structures itself to provide future counterdrug support.

Section 4.2 presents the CONUS LEA support requirements and their identified Army resources and capabilities. That section is organized in the seven categories of LEA support requirements described in section 3.1. Within each category the Army's support capabilities and resources are matched to the LEA tasks they support (or could potentially support).

Section 4.3 presents the OCONUS support requirements and the matching Army capabilities and resources.

Early in the data-collection process we became aware of an interesting phenomenon. LEA officials in different agencies and in different parts of the country made a number of similar comments on Army counterdrug support. It soon became apparent that these officials were talking about a relatively small set of key issues that we believe the Army and DoD should consider in making decisions about future counterdrug support. We observed the same phenomenon when interviewing subject-matter experts at the Army schools and centers, the CONUSAs, SOUTHCOM, USARSO, and within the Bolivian Country Team. These comments reinforced several observations we had previously made about the Army counterdrug support process and organization. The consistency of these comments from a variety of sources reinforced our assessment of their significance. Therefore, we have included a synopsis of these issues and observations in section 4.4, and have used these findings in section 5 to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

4.2 LEA SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN CONUS, MATCHED TO ARMY CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES

The objectives of the FEA, as described in section 1, were to develop a list of LEA tasks and to match those tasks (and their implied requirements for support) to Army counterdrug support capabilities and resources. Section 3 described the approach used to accomplish these objectives. This section presents the findings for CONUS requirements and capabilities.

The CONUS findings are organized into the seven categories of LEA support requirements listed in section 3. For ease of reference, we repeat below the categories of support requirements and the corresponding Army staff functional areas. Appendix B lists the CONUS LEA tasks in the requirements categories.

Support Requirement Category	Corresponding Staff Functional Area
I: Administrative	G-1
II: Intelligence	G-2
III: Operations	G-3
IV: Logistics	G-4
V: Command, control, and communications (C ³)	G-3
VI: Special tasks	G-1
VII: Training	G-3

This FEA groups Army support capabilities and resources into four categories: operational; non-operational; infrastructure development; and research, development, and acquisition (RD&A). Our definitions of those categories follow:

- Operational support is that in which the Army provides troops and equipment, usually in the form of a regularly-constituted unit, to support specific counterdrug operations conducted by LEAs.
- Non-operational support is that in which the Army provides equipment without personnel to a requesting LEA.
- Infrastructure development support includes construction or improvement of facilities, training, provision of personnel with special skills, and other support intended to increase the general capability of an LEA.
- Research, development, and acquisition support applies the Army's system-acquisition assets to develop or acquire equipment applicable to LEA counterdrug tasks.

The remainder of this section describes each of the seven categories of LEA support requirements. Tables list the tasks that generate requirements and match them to identified Army capabilities and resources. In the tables, those tasks form the column headings. The left sides of the tables (the row headings) are the Army support capabilities that apply to that category of LEA requirement, organized into the four types of support defined above. A shaded cell in the body of the table indicates that the Army capability heading that row could at least potentially support the LEA task heading that column. The discussions that

accompany the tables include our findings on gaps identified between requirements and capabilities.¹⁴

It is important to note that:

- By policy, Army support is not provided without a legal review,
- The list of capabilities has not undergone a legal review, and
- Some of the listed capabilities would not pass a current legal review.

As stated in section 3, MITRE's approach was to ask Army subject-matter experts to identify capabilities and resources without considering current constraints on employment. The capabilities in this section therefore represent both existing support and potential support that the Army could provide under appropriate conditions. For example, the Army conducts area searches to identify counterdrug targets such as marijuana fields. This type of search has been judged legal as long as the search does not focus on too small an area, the area is public land (or private land with owner permission), and all information collected is turned over to an LEA. The Army, however, cannot currently search shipping containers at a port of entry, because this type of search has been judged too narrowly focused on individual property. The National Guard, however, can perform container searches, and the Army may be able to do so in the future if the law or its interpretation changes. A more detailed examination of the legal constraints on Army counterdrug support is a potential subject of further study. Section 5 discusses legal constraints in more detail.

4.2.1 Category I: LEA Requirements for Administrative Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This requirements category includes all tasks associated with the administrative aspects of LEA counterdrug operations, such as personnel administration and preparing and disseminating reports. In an Army unit, these types of tasks would come under the staff cognizance of the G-1.

Every organization has administrative requirements such as maintaining personnel records and establishing a correspondence system. In an LEA, the need to keep records that meet legal requirements for a prosecutable case increases the administrative burden. Often the LEA's budget will not allow hiring enough dedicated administrative personnel; as a result, those who conduct the investigations must also do much of the administrative work. The rationale for having the Army provide administrative support to LEAs is to free sworn officers to deal directly with the drug problem.

Table 4.1 presents our matches of Army support capabilities to LEA administrative tasks. The table indicates that there is at least one Army support capability for each of the

¹⁴ Note that the subject-matter experts who identified Army capabilities and resources were not asked to assign capabilities to individual requirements. MITRE made those assignments, based on our understanding of the LEA's needs and the Army's resources. Different judgments would produce different matches, although numerous and large differences seem unlikely.

Table 4.1 LEA Administrative Tasks and Matching Army Capabilities

Army Capabilities	Preparing, Storing, and Distributing Reports	Preparing Testimony	Establishing and Maintaining a Chain of Custody for Evidence	Maintaining LEA Personnel Records	Maintaining LEA Financial Records
Operational Support					
1. Supply management					
2. Data entry					
3. Computer programming					
4. Aviation administration					
5. Conducting background investigations					
Non-Operational Support					
1. Lending audio-visual equipment					
2. Providing computer equipment					
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Training personnel to conduct trend and statistical analyses					
2. Training personnel in grant approval process					
3. Providing clerical personnel					
4. Installing automated administrative system					
5. Training personnel in computer skills					
6. Providing computer systems personnel					
RD&A Support					
1. Developing customized computer programs					
2. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment					

Table 4.1 LEA Administrative Tasks and Matching Army Capabilities (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Preparing and Maintaining Statistical Records	Preparing and Maintaining Budgets, Grant Applications, and Other Financial Documents	Establishing and Maintaining a Correspondence System	Conducting Background Investigations on Job Applicants	General Office Administration
Operational Support					
1. Supply management					
2. Data entry					
3. Computer programming					
4. Aviation administration					
5. Conducting background investigations					
Non-Operational Support					
1. Lending audio-visual equipment					
2. Providing computer equipment					
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Training personnel to conduct trend and statistical analyses					
2. Training personnel in grant approval process					
3. Providing clerical personnel					
4. Installing automated administrative system					
5. Training personnel in computer skills					
6. Providing computer systems personnel					
RD&A Support					
1. Developing customized computer programs					
2. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment					

identified LEA tasks. Aviation administration (for example, keeping maintenance logs and pilot logs) is the only capability identified for which there is no matching LEA task; in this case, the FEA may have missed existing tasks because none of the agents we interviewed were involved with LEA aviation activities.

4.2.2 Category II: LEA Requirements for Intelligence Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This requirements category includes all LEA tasks associated with acquiring information on drug sources, traffickers, distributors, or users. In an Army unit, these tasks would fall under the staff cognizance of the G-2. The FEA groups the tasks in four sub-categories:

- Intelligence data collection includes tasks such as search, surveillance, interrogation, use of informants, accessing existing data (IRS data, motor-vehicle license data, telephone data, etc.), and employment of various sensors.
- Intelligence data analysis includes tasks performed to transform raw data (information) into operationally useful data (intelligence).
- Management of intelligence data includes all tasks associated with storing, updating, or providing access to data.
- Dissemination of intelligence data includes all tasks associated with providing intelligence data to the appropriate agencies or agents to support counterdrug operations.

Almost every LEA official we interviewed—from street agents to heads of multi-agency task forces—identified collection and management of information as high-priority requirements. Information acts as a force multiplier in the war on drugs by allowing LEAs to focus their scarce resources on critical targets. The most important difference between the ways LEAs and the Services use information is that, for LEAs, information is also evidence that must be controlled and handled so that it can be used in court. This is an example of the differences in LEA and Army approaches that section 4.4 discusses in more detail. The major effect of this particular difference is that, to be fully effective, Army personnel supporting LEAs in information collection and management often need prior training in, and familiarization with, the LEA working environment and procedures.

Tables 4.2 through 4.4 match Army capabilities to LEA tasks in information collection. Table 4.2 considers operational support, table 4.3 considers non-operational and RD&A support, and table 4.4 considers infrastructure development support. Tables 4.5 to 4.7 match LEA tasks in information analysis, management, and dissemination to Army capabilities in, respectively, operational support, non-operational and RD&A support, and infrastructure development support.

Table 4.2 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Informants and Cooperating Witnesses	Imaging Devices and Other Sensors	Seized or Public Records	Interrogations of Suspects	Undercover Operations
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground reconnaissance					
2. Conducting day and night aerial reconnaissance					
3. Providing long-range reconnaissance and surveillance teams					
4. Conducting threat assessments					
5. Conducting intelligence analyses					
6. Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield					
7. Providing counterintelligence support					
8. Providing HUMINT collection support for debriefings, interrogations					
9. Providing IMINT collection support (aerial imagery, photos)					
10. Providing SIGINT collection support (communication intercepts)					
11. Conducting LP/OP operations					
12. Providing aerial platform for SIGINT (EH-60 or Mohawk)					
13. Conducting aerial forward looking infrared (FLIR) reconnaissance					
14. Conducting reconnaissance with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)					
15. Operating remotely-emplaced battlefield sensor system (REMBASS)					
16. Providing ground radar					

Table 4.2 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Aerial Imagery	LEA Databases	Ground Searches	Aerial Searches	Field Notes
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground reconnaissance					
2. Conducting day and night aerial reconnaissance					
3. Providing long-range reconnaissance and surveillance teams					
4. Conducting threat assessments					
5. Conducting intelligence analyses					
6. Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield					
7. Providing counterintelligence support					
8. Providing HUMINT collection support for debriefings, interrogations					
9. Providing IMINT collection support (aerial imagery, photos)					
10. Providing SIGINT collection support (communication intercepts)					
11. Conducting LP/OP operations					
12. Providing aerial platform for SIGINT (EH-60 or Mohawk)					
13. Conduct aerial forward looking infrared (FLIR) reconnaissance					
14. Conducting reconnaissance with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)					
15. Operating remotely-emplaced battlefield sensor system (REMBASS)					
16. Providing ground radar					

Table 4.2 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Field Tests of Controlled Substances	Forensic Analyses	Communications Intercepts (wired and wireless)	Translations of Documents, Interviews, and Wiretap Information	Surveillance Videos and Photographs
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground reconnaissance					
2. Conducting day and night aerial reconnaissance					
3. Providing long-range recon and surveillance teams					
4. Conducting threat assessments					
5. Conducting intelligence analyses					
6. Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield					
7. Providing counterintelligence					
8. Providing HUMINT collection support for debriefings, interrogations					
9. Providing IMINT collection support (aerial imagery, photos)					
10. Providing SIGINT collection support (communication intercepts)					
11. LP/OP operations					
12. Providing aerial platform for SIGINT (EH-60 or Mohawk)					
13. Conducting aerial forward looking infrared (FLIR) reconnaissance					
14. Conducting reconnaissance with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)					
15. Operating remotely-emplaced battlefield sensor system (REMBASS)					
16. Providing ground radar					

Table 4.3 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Informants and Cooperating Witnesses	Imaging Devices and Other Sensors	Seized or Public Records	Interrogations of Suspects	Undercover Operations
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing night observation devices					
2. Providing detection devices and other sensors					
3. Providing REMBASS equipment					
4. Providing topographic support (maps, charts)					
5. Providing airborne sensors					
RD&A Support					
1. Developing software to assist threat assessments					
2. Developing or acquiring sensors or detection systems					
3. Developing or acquiring intelligence management systems					
4. Developing or acquiring intelligence collection systems (e.g., eavesdropping devices, body bugs, communication intercept devices)					
5. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment					

Table 4.3 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Aerial Imagery	LEA Databases	Ground Searches	Aerial Searches	Field Notes
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing night observation devices					
2. Providing detection devices and other sensors					
3. Providing REMBASS equipment					
4. Providing topographic support (maps, charts)					
5. Providing airborne sensors					
RD&A Support					
1. Developing software to assist threat assessments					
2. Developing or acquiring sensors or detection systems					
3. Developing or acquiring intelligence management systems					
4. Developing or acquiring intelligence collection systems (e.g., eavesdropping devices, body bugs, communication intercept devices)					
5. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment					

Table 4.3 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Field Tests of Controlled Substances	Forensic Analyses	Communications Intercepts (wired and wireless)	Translations of Documents, Interviews, and Wiretap Information	Surveillance Videos and Photographs
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing night observation devices					
2. Providing detection devices and other sensors					
3. Providing REMBASS equipment					
4. Providing topographic support (maps, charts)					
5. Providing airborne sensors					
RD&A Support					
1. Developing software to assist threat assessments					
2. Developing or acquiring sensors and detection systems					
3. Developing or acquiring intelligence management systems					
4. Developing or acquiring intelligence collections systems (e.g., eavesdropping devices, body bugs, communication intercept devices)					
5. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment					

Table 4.4 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Informants and Cooperating Witnesses	Imaging Devices and Other Sensors	Seized or Public Records	Interrogations of Suspects	Undercover Operations
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Conducting threat assessment training					
2. Conducting training in counterdrug investigations					
3. Conducting criminal intelligence training					
4. Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance training					
5. Conducting patrol training					
6. Conducting land navigation training					
7. Conducting training in: electronic support measures, collection management, intelligence organization, the intelligence cycle, intelligence dissemination, intelligence analysis					
8. Providing linguists and translators					
9. Providing intelligence analysts					
10. Providing computer systems personnel					
11. Providing C ³ I personnel					
12. Training personnel in computer skills					
13. Providing training operating sensors, detection systems					
14. Providing training in IPB					
15. Providing training in drug identification, drug investigation techniques, and methodology					

Table 4.4 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Aerial Imagery	LEA Databases	Ground Searches	Aerial Searches	Field Notes
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Conducting threat assessment training					
2. Conducting training in counterdrug investigations					
3. Conducting criminal intelligence training					
4. Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance training					
5. Conducting patrol training					
6. Conducting land navigation training					
7. Conducting training in: electronic support measures, collection management, intelligence organization, the intelligence cycle, intelligence dissemination, intelligence analysis					
8. Providing linguists and translators					
9. Providing intelligence analysts					
10. Providing computer systems personnel					
11. Providing C ³ I personnel					
12. Training personnel in computer skills					
13. Providing training operating sensors, detection systems					
14. Providing training in IPB					
15. Providing training in drug identification, drug investigation techniques, and methodology					

Table 4.4 LEA Information Collection Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Collecting Information From:				
	Field Tests of Controlled Substances	Forensic Analyses	Communications Intercepts (wired and wireless)	Translations of Documents, Interviews, and Wiretap Information	Surveillance Videos and Photographs
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Conducting threat assessment training					
2. Conducting training in counterdrug investigations					
3. Conducting criminal intelligence training					
4. Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance training					
5. Conducting patrol training					
6. Conducting land navigation training					
7. Conducting training in: electronic support measures, collection management, intelligence organization, the intelligence cycle, intelligence dissemination, intelligence analysis					
8. Providing linguists and translators					
9. Providing intelligence analysts					
10. Providing computer systems personnel					
11. Providing C ³ I personnel					
12. Training personnel in computer skills					
13. Providing training operating sensors, detection systems					
14. Providing training in IPB					
15. Providing training in drug identification, drug investigation techniques, and methodology					

Table 4.5 LEA Information Analysis, Management, and Dissemination Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support

Army Capabilities	Analysis	Management				Dissemination
	Analyzing Information	Storing Collected Information	Updating Information	Exchanging Information with Other Agencies	Ensuring the Security of Information	Distributing Information
Operational Support						
1. Conducting ground reconnaissance						
2. Conducting day and night aerial reconnaissance						
3. Providing long-range reconnaissance and surveillance teams						
4. Conducting threat assessments						
5. Intelligence analyses						
6. Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield						
7. Providing counterintelligence support						
8. Providing HUMINT collection support for debriefings, interrogations						
9. Providing IMINT collection support (aerial imagery, photos)						
10. Providing SIGINT collection support (communication intercepts)						
11. LP/OP operations						
12. Providing aerial platform for SIGINT (EH-60 or Mohawk)						
13. Conducting aerial forward looking infrared (FLIR) reconnaissance						
14. Conducting reconnaissance with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)						
15. Operating remotely-emplaced battlefield sensor system (REMBASS)						
16. Providing ground radar						

Table 4.6 LEA Information Analysis, Management, and Dissemination Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support

Army Capabilities	Analysis	Management				Dissemination
	Analyzing Information	Storing Collected Information	Updating Information	Exchanging Information with Other Agencies	Ensuring Security of Information	Distributing Information
Non-Operational Support						
1. Conducting ground reconnaissance						
2. Providing detection devices and other sensors						
3. Providing REMBASS equipment						
4. Providing topographic support (maps, charts)						
5. Providing airborne sensors						
RD&A Support						
1. Developing software to assist threat assessments						
2. Developing or acquiring sensors and detection systems						
3. Developing or acquiring intelligence management systems						
4. Developing or acquiring intelligence collections systems (e.g., eavesdropping devices, body bugs, communication intercept devices)						
5. Assisting in acquiring surplus equipment						

Table 4.7 LEA Information Analysis, Management, and Dissemination Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support

Army Capabilities	Analysis	Management				Dissemination
	Analyzing Information	Storing Collected Information	Updating Information	Exchanging Information with Other Agencies	Ensuring Security of Information	Distributing Information
Infrastructure Development Support						
1. Conducting threat assessment training						
2. Conducting training in counterdrug investigations						
3. Conducting criminal intelligence training						
4. Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance training						
5. Conducting patrol training						
6. Conducting land navigation training						
7. Conducting training in: electronic support measures, collection management, intelligence organization, the intelligence cycle, intelligence dissemination, intelligence analysis						
8. Providing linguists and translators						
9. Providing intelligence analysts						
10. Providing computer systems personnel						
11. Providing C ³ I personnel						
12. Training personnel in computer skills						
13. Providing training operating sensors, detection systems						
14. Providing training in IPB						
15. Providing training in drug identification, drug investigation techniques and methodology						

These tables show that there is at least one Army capability to support each of the LEA information tasks. The Army also has some operational capability in the area of forensic analysis, but it wasn't clear to us that the capability is sufficient to provide useful support. The Army Military Police school can probably provide training in preparing field notes. The discussion in section 4.2.7 of Category VII requirements presents in more detail the school's capabilities to provide training in basic police procedures.

4.2.3 Category III: LEA Requirements for Operational Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This requirements category includes all tasks associated with planning or conducting LEA counterdrug operations: arrests, seizures of drugs or property, tracking or seizing illegal funds, providing security, conducting deterrence operations, and other counterdrug missions unique to specific agencies or departments. In an Army unit, these types of tasks would come under the staff cognizance of the G-3 Plans and Operations sections. This category also includes long-range or strategic planning tasks and certain support tasks—such as incarcerating offenders or performing decontamination of drug laboratory sites—that the LEAs have identified as being of an operational nature.

Although federal law forbids the Army to participate in surveillance, investigations, or arrests of civilians in the U.S., many Army capabilities can support LEAs in those activities without violating existing laws. Tables 4.8 through 4.10 match Army capabilities to LEA operational tasks. Table 4.8 considers Army operational support, table 4.9 considers non-operational and RD&A support, and table 4.10 considers infrastructure development support. These tables indicate that Army capabilities can support all but three LEA operational tasks. Those three are: conducting financial investigations, driving vehicles in emergency or pursuit situations, and prosecuting offenders. The Army MP school does provide driver training, but specifically for protective services. The Army's capability to provide legal support, which might be used to prosecute offenders, is discussed under support for category VI (special tasks).

Table 4.8 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support

Army Capabilities	Planning (Long- and Short-Term)	Identifying Suspects	Identifying Targets	Conducting Searches	Conducting Undercover Operations
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground area searches					
2. Conducting day and night aerial searches					
3. Conducting airborne sensor and imagery operations					
4. Conducting underwater searches					
5. Conducting tunnel detection operations					
6. Providing area security (security cordon)					
7. Conducting terrain denial operations					
8. Providing security for facilities and individuals					
9. Providing sniper teams					
10. Operating armored vehicles					
11. Conducting UAV operations					
12. Searching buildings, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and containers					
13. Providing labor parties					
14. Providing canine teams					
15. Conducting chemical decontamination operations					

**Table 4.8 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support
(Continued)**

Army Capabilities	Conducting Financial Investigations to Seize Illegal Funds	Destroying, Eradicating, or Seizing Drug Cultivation Facilities	Destroying or Seizing Drug Production Facilities	Conducting Security Operations	Conducting Air or Ground Deterrence Operations
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground area searches					
2. Conducting day and night aerial searches					
3. Conducting airborne sensor and imagery operations					
4. Conducting underwater searches					
5. Conducting tunnel detection operations					
6. Providing area security (security cordon)					
7. Conducting terrain denial operations					
8. Providing security for facilities and individuals					
9. Providing sniper teams					
10. Operating armored vehicles					
11. Conducting UAV operations					
12. Searching buildings, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and containers					
13. Providing labor parties					
14. Providing canine teams					
15. Conducting chemical decontamination operations					

**Table 4.8 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support
(Continued)**

Army Capabilities	Conducting Stationary or Mobile Surveillance of Drug Suspects, Sites, and Vehicles	Driving Vehicle in Emergency or Pursuit Situations	Employing Special Weapons	Conducting Underwater Search and Recovery Operations	Making Arrests
Operational Support					
1. Conducting ground area searches					
2. Conducting day and night aerial searches					
3. Conducting airborne sensor and imagery operations					
4. Conducting underwater searches					
5. Conducting tunnel detection operations					
6. Providing area security (security cordon)					
7. Conducting terrain denial operations					
8. Providing security for facilities and individuals					
9. Providing sniper teams					
10. Operating armored vehicles					
11. Conducting UAV operations					
12. Searching buildings, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and containers					
13. Providing labor parties					
14. Providing canine teams					
15. Conducting chemical decontamination operations					

**Table 4.8 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support
(Concluded)**

Army Capabilities	Seizing Contra-band	Conducting SWAT Operations	Prosecuting Offenders	Operating Facilities for the Incarceration of Offenders	Performing Chemical Decontamination of Drug Lab Sites	Restoring Eradicated Drug-Growing Areas
Operational Support						
1. Conducting ground area searches						
2. Conducting day and night aerial searches						
3. Conducting airborne sensor or imagery operations						
4. Conducting underwater searches						
5. Conducting tunnel detection operations						
6. Providing area security (security cordon)						
7. Conducting terrain denial operations						
8. Providing security for facilities and individuals						
9. Providing sniper teams						
10. Operating armored vehicles						
11. Conducting UAV operations						
12. Searching buildings, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and containers						
13. Providing labor parties						
14. Providing canine teams						
15. Conducting chemical decontamination operations						

Table 4.9 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support

Army Capabilities	Planning (Long- and Short-Term)	Identifying Suspects	Identifying Targets	Conducting Searches	Conducting Undercover Operations
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing weapons					
2. Providing secure radios, tactical fax equipment, TACSAT radios, field phones, or low-level encryption devices					
3. Providing night vision devices or other sensors					
4. Providing armored vehicles					
5. Providing munitions, pyrotechnics, or demolitions					
6. Providing mine detectors					
7. Providing individual protective equipment					
8. Providing fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft					
9. Providing UAVs					
10. Providing the automated mission-planning system					
11. Providing chemical protective equipment					
RD&A Support					
1. Providing assistance in acquiring individual equipment or weapons					
2. Developing or acquiring herbicides					
3. Developing or acquiring "nonlethal" weapons					

Table 4.9 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Conducting Financial Investigations to Seize Illegal Funds	Destroying, Eradicating, or Seizing Drug Cultivation Facilities	Destroying or Seizing Drug Production Facilities	Conducting Security Operations	Conducting Air or Ground Deterrence Operations
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing weapons					
2. Providing secure radios, tactical fax equipment, TACSAT radios, field phones, or low-level encryption devices					
3. Providing night vision devices or other sensors					
4. Providing armored vehicles					
5. Providing munitions, pyrotechnics, or demolitions					
6. Providing mine detectors					
7. Providing individual protective equipment					
8. Providing fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft					
9. Providing UAVs					
10. Providing the automated mission-planning system					
11. Providing chemical protective equipment					
RD&A Support					
1. Providing assistance in acquiring individual equipment or weapons					
2. Developing or acquiring herbicides					
3. Developing or acquiring "nonlethal" weapons					

Table 4.9 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Conducting Stationary or Mobile Surveillance of Drug Suspects, Sites, and Vehicles	Driving Vehicle in Emergency or Pursuit Situations	Employing Special Weapons	Conducting Underwater Search and Recovery Operations	Making Arrests
Non-Operational Support					
1. Providing weapons					
2. Providing secure radios, tactical fax equipment, TACSAT radios, field phones, or low-level encryption devices					
3. Providing night vision devices or other sensors					
4. Providing armored vehicles					
5. Providing munitions, pyrotechnics, and demolitions					
6. Providing mine detectors					
7. Providing individual protective equipment					
8. Providing fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft					
9. Providing UAVs					
10. Providing the automated mission-planning system					
11. Providing chemical protective equipment					
RD&A Support					
1. Providing assistance in acquiring individual equipment or weapons					
2. Developing or acquiring herbicides					
3. Developing or acquiring "nonlethal" weapons					

Table 4.9 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Seizing Contra- band	Conduct- ing SWAT Opera- tions	Prosecut- ing Offend- ers	Operating Facilities for the Incarcera- tion of Offenders	Performing Chemical Decontam- ination of Drug Lab Sites	Restoring Endangered Drug- Growing Areas
Non-Operational Support						
1. Providing weapons						
2. Providing secure radios, tactical fax equipment, TACSAT radios, field phones, or low-level encryption devices						
3. Providing night vision devices or other sensors						
4. Providing armored vehicles						
5. Providing munitions, pyrotechnics, or demolitions						
6. Providing mine detectors						
7. Providing individual protective equipment						
8. Providing fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft						
9. Providing UAVs						
10. Providing the automated mission planning system						
11. Providing chemical protective equipment						
RD&A Support						
1. Providing assistance in acquiring individual equipment or weapons						
2. Developing or acquiring herbicides						
3. Developing or acquiring "nonlethal" weapons						

Table 4.10 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support

Army Capabilities	Planning (Long- and Short-Term)	Identifying Suspects	Identifying Targets	Conducting Searches	Conducting Undercover Operations
Infrastructure Development Support					
1. Providing paramilitary training					
2. Providing communications training					
3. Providing weapons training					
4. Providing training in small-boat operations					
5. Providing air-mobile training					
6. Providing training in undercover operations					
7. Providing special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training					
8. Providing protective services (PS) training					
9. Providing training for correctional officers					
10. Providing advisors for air operations					
11. Providing training in ground and aerial search techniques					
12. Providing canine team training					
13. Providing incarceration facilities					

Table 4.10 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Conducting Financial Investigations to Seize Illegal Funds	Destroying, Eradicating, or Seizing Drug Cultivation Facilities	Destroying or Seizing Drug Production Facilities	Conducting Security Operations	Conducting Air or Ground Deterrence Operations
Infrastructure Development					
1. Providing paramilitary training					
2. Providing communications training					
3. Providing weapons training					
4. Providing training in small-boat operations					
5. Providing air-mobile training					
6. Providing training in undercover operations					
7. Providing special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training					
8. Providing protective services (PS) training					
9. Providing training for correctional officers					
10. Providing advisors for air operations					
11. Providing training in ground and aerial search techniques					
12. Providing canine team training					
13. Providing incarceration facilities					

Table 4.10 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Continued)

Army Capabilities	Conducting Stationary or Mobile Surveillance of Drug Suspects, Sites, and Vehicles	Driving Vehicle in Emergency or Pursuit Situations	Employing Special Weapons	Conducting Underwater Search and Recovery Operations	Making Arrests
Infrastructure Development					
1. Providing paramilitary training					
2. Providing communications training					
3. Providing weapons training					
4. Providing training in small-boat operations					
5. Providing air-mobile training					
6. Providing training in undercover operations					
7. Providing special weapons and (SWAT) tactics training					
8. Providing protective services (PS) training					
9. Providing training for correctional officers					
10. Providing advisors for air operations					
11. Providing training in ground and aerial search techniques					
12. Providing canine team training					
13. Providing incarceration facilities					

Table 4.10 LEA Operational Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Seizing Contraband	Conducting SWAT Operations	Prosecuting Offenders	Operating Facilities for the Incarceration of Offenders	Performing Chemical Decontamination of Drug Lab Sites	Restoring Expropriated Drug-Growing Areas
Infrastructure Development						
1. Providing paramilitary training						
2. Providing communications training						
3. Providing weapons training						
4. Providing training in small-boat operations						
5. Providing air-mobile training						
6. Providing training in undercover operations						
7. Providing special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training						
8. Providing protective services (PS) training						
9. Providing training for correctional officers						
10. Providing advisors for air operations						
11. Providing training in ground and aerial search techniques						
12. Providing canine team training						
13. Providing incarceration facilities						

4.2.4 Category IV: LEA Requirements for Logistics Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This category includes all tasks necessary for the logistical support of LEA counterdrug operations: transportation of agents, suspects, and seized contraband; maintenance of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment; construction or maintenance of facilities; medical support; and others. In an Army unit, these types of tasks would come under the staff cognizance of the G-4. Tables 4.11 through 4.13 present the matches of LEA logistics tasks and Army support capabilities.

Because there are few legal or policy constraints on providing logistics support, the Army has been active in this area for a number of years. The principal constraint on providing this type of support is that the Army must obtain a waiver from the Economy Act (Title 31, U.S. Code, section 1536) if the support is to be provided at no cost to the LEA. Such a waiver requires that the Army show that the unit providing the support receives compensating training value. Because many Army units have primary missions to perform the types of tasks listed as capabilities in tables 4.11 through 4.13, it is often possible to justify such a waiver. If the task involves buying materials, such as culverts for road construction, the LEA must bear the purchase cost. However, Federal counterdrug funds may offset some of these costs.

When we asked LEA officials to list their counterdrug tasks, they did not recommend additions to the logistic tasks on our preliminary list. We believe that this indicates that the LEA community is oriented more toward operations than logistics. The Army, conversely, integrates logistics support into all its operational planning. It appears, therefore, that the Army participants were more knowledgeable than the LEA participants about logistics support. Tables 4.11 through 4.13 indicate that each LEA logistics task can be supported by at least one (and more often several) Army support capabilities. There are 13 support capabilities, such as providing helicopter resupply, that we believe could support counterdrug operations, but for which LEAs did not identify an LEA task.

Table 4.11 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support

Army Capabilities	Transporting Agents to and from Operational Areas	Securing and Transporting Suspects, Contraband, Seized Equipment, and Funds	Providing Medical Support for Operations	Storing and Maintaining LEA Vehicles, Aircraft, or Vessels
Operational Support				
1. Providing ground transportation (cargo and personnel)				
2. Providing aerial transportation (cargo and personnel)				
3. Establishing and maintaining communication systems				
4. Providing field feeding*				
5. Providing vehicle recovery and repair				
6. Providing medical support				
7. Providing medical evacuation				
8. Providing search and rescue				
9. Providing transportation for demolitions and munitions*				
10. Providing helicopter resupply*				
11. Providing field petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) support*				
12. Developing and improving roads				
13. Building and repairing fences				
14. Providing counter-mobility (obstacles and barriers)*				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

Table 4.11 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Operational Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Storing and Maintaining LEA Weapons and Equipment	Constructing, Upgrading or Maintaining LEA Facilities	Providing Canine Support for Searches and Other Tasks	Acquiring Supplies and Equipment
Operational Support				
1. Providing ground transportation (cargo and personnel)				
2. Providing aerial transportation (cargo and personnel)				
3. Establishing and maintaining communication systems				
4. Providing field feeding*				
5. Providing vehicle recovery and repair				
6. Providing medical support				
7. Providing medical evacuation				
8. Providing search and rescue				
9. Providing transportation for demolitions and munitions*				
10. Providing helicopter resupply*				
11. Providing field petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) support*				
12. Developing and improving roads				
13. Building and repairing fences				
14. Providing counter-mobility (obstacles and barriers)*				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

Table 4.12 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support

Army Capabilities	Transporting Agents to and from Operational Areas	Securing and Transporting Suspects, Contraband, Seized Equipment, and Funds	Providing Medical Support for Operations	Storing and Maintaining LEA Vehicles, Aircraft, or Vessels
Non-Operational Support				
1. Providing field shelters for personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment				
2. Providing vehicles: personnel, cargo, rough-terrain				
3. Providing generators and field power equipment*				
4. Providing fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft				
5. Providing helicopter resupply equipment*				
6. Providing POL support equipment*				
7. Providing general engineer equipment				
8. Providing boats and marine equipment*				
9. Providing engineer personnel				
RD&A Support				
1. Providing assistance in providing supplies and equipment				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

Table 4.12 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Non-Operational and RD&A Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Storing and Maintaining LEA Weapons and Equipment	Constructing, Upgrading, or Maintaining LEA Facilities	Providing Canine Support for Searches and Other Tasks	Acquiring Supplies and Equipment
Non-Operational Support				
1. Providing field shelters for personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment				
2. Providing vehicles: personnel, cargo, rough-terrain				
3. Providing generators and field power equipment*				
4. Providing fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft				
5. Providing helicopter resupply equipment*				
6. Providing POL support equipment*				
7. Providing general engineer equipment				
8. Providing boats and marine equipment*				
9. Providing engineer personnel				
RD&A Support				
1. Providing assistance in providing supplies and equipment				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

Table 4.13 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support

Army Capabilities	Transporting Agents to and from Operational Areas	Securing and Transporting Suspects, Contraband, Seized Equipment, and Funds	Providing Medical Support for Operations	Storing and Maintaining LEA Vehicles, Aircraft, or Vessels
Infrastructure Development				
1. Providing training in helicopter resupply*				
2. Providing training in aircraft loading*				
3. Providing equipment, vehicle, and aircraft maintenance training				
4. Providing maintenance personnel for equipment, vehicles, and aircraft				
5. Building watchtowers and observation posts				
6. Building and improving ranges and facilities				
7. Providing secure storage facilities				
8. Providing engineer training (including explosive ordnance training)				
9. Providing medical training				
10. Providing air traffic control personnel*				
11. Providing aviation life support personnel*				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

Table 4.13 LEA Logistics Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development Support (Concluded)

Army Capabilities	Storing and Maintaining LEA Weapons and Equipment	Constructing, Upgrading or Maintaining LEA Facilities	Providing Canine Support for Searches and Other Tasks	Acquiring Supplies and Equipment
Infrastructure Development				
1. Providing training in helicopter resupply*				
2. Providing training in aircraft loading*				
3. Providing equipment, vehicle, and aircraft maintenance training				
4. Providing maintenance personnel for equipment, vehicles, and aircraft				
5. Building watchtowers and observation posts				
6. Building and improving ranges and facilities				
7. Providing secure storage facilities				
8. Providing engineer training (including explosive ordnance training)				
9. Providing medical training				
10. Providing air traffic control personnel*				
11. Providing aviation life support personnel*				

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability.

4.2.5 Category V: LEA Requirements for Command, Control, and Communications (C³) Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This category includes all tasks associated with supporting control or coordination of LEA operations or with supporting communications between LEAs. In an Army unit, all staff functional areas share responsibility for command and control. Communications tasks are under the staff cognizance of the communications special staff section under the direction of the G-3. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 present the matches of LEA C³ tasks and Army support capabilities.

The C³ area is another instance where the LEA participants did not add tasks to the list provided on the worksheet. LEA interviewees tended to focus on the communications aspects of C³ and provided little detail on their needs for support in command and control. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 include only two command-and-control tasks—preparing operational plans, and coordinating plans and actions—and these are very broad tasks. Although tables 4.14 and 4.15 identify many matches for these tasks, it is not clear how well Army support can support the unknown specific tasks. LEA needs for command-and-control support is a potential area for future study.

C³ support is another area in which the Army can provide meaningful assistance to LEAs without significant legal or policy constraints. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show that each of the identified LEA tasks is supported by three or more Army capabilities.

Table 4.14 LEA C³ Tasks and Matching Army Operational and Non-Operational Support

Army Capabilities	Communications Planning within Own Agency	Communications Planning with Other Agencies	Preparing Operational Plans	Coordinating Plans and Actions	Establishing and Maintaining Operational Communications	Ensuring Communications Security
Operational Support						
1. Establishing, maintaining communications networks						
2. Operating aerial C ² platform						
3. Operating UAVs configured for C ² support (e.g., radio relay)						
4. Operating air traffic control facilities						
5. Conducting deception operations*						
6. Providing electronic countermeasures*						
Non-Operational Support						
1. Providing secure radios, tactical fax equipment, TACSAT radios, field phones, or low-level encryption devices						
2. Providing position-location devices and navigation equipment						
3. Providing C ² vehicles						
4. Providing C ² aircraft						
5. Providing an automated mission-planning system						

* No LEA tasks were identified for this capability

Table 4.15 LEA C³ Tasks and Matching Army Infrastructure Development and RD&A Support

Army Capabilities	Communications Planning within Own Agency	Communications Planning with Other Agencies	Preparing Operational Plans	Coordinating Plans and Actions	Establishing and Maintaining Operational Communications	Ensuring Communications Security
Infrastructure Development Support						
1. Providing training in staff operations						
2. Providing personnel to assist in staff planning						
3. Providing personnel to perform technical communications planning						
4. Building or upgrading C ³ I facilities						
5. Providing training in C ³ I						
6. Providing personnel to operate C ³ I facilities						
7. Providing training in computer skills						
RD&A Support						
1. Assisting in acquiring C ² equipment						
2. Developing or acquiring communications systems that can function on police or military frequencies						

4.2.6 Category VI: LEA Requirements for Support of Special Tasks Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This category includes all LEA tasks typically performed by personnel not in direct law enforcement roles: for example, public relations or providing legal advice. In an Army unit these tasks are under the staff cognizance of the public affairs, legal, or political special staff sections under the direction of the G-1. Table 4.16 presents the matches.

Table 4.16 LEA Special Tasks and Matching Army Capabilities

Army Capabilities	Providing Public Relations Support for Operations	Providing Legal Assistance Support for Operations	Providing Drug Education and Prevention Support to the Public
Operational Support			
1. Operating a public relations or media relations facility			
2. Conducting psychological operations			
3. Producing publications, films, and videos			
Non-Operational Support			
1. Providing audio-visual equipment			
2. Providing publication and production equipment			
Infrastructure Development			
1. Providing public affairs personnel			
2. Providing lawyers and legal support personnel			
3. Providing training in drug law			

Although MITRE's preliminary list included only three special tasks, the LEA respondents did not add any special tasks to that list. Although these tasks may seem to be peripheral to the counterdrug effort, the negative effects of not performing, or at least considering, them can be significant. The importance of each of the three special tasks is discussed briefly below:

- The media and the public can be either powerful allies or formidable foes, depending on their perceptions of how well an LEA is serving the public interest. The Army can help to shape this perception by supporting the planning and execution of public relations campaigns.
- Planning for a counterdrug operation should always include a legal review to ensure that arrests and seizures will provide evidence usable in court. The Army can help in these routine reviews and can also provide legal support to prosecutor offices during periods of heavy caseloads.
- Providing drug abuse education and prevention support to the public is the only special task listed that directly relates to reducing the demand for drugs. We included this task because we believe that the Army has capabilities in this area that could be used without violating DoD's policy of emphasis on the supply-reduction side of the problem.

There is an Army special-task capability—psychological operations—for which our analysis did not identify an LEA requirement. This failure is due to the fact that LEAs do not perform psychological operations. It is not certain that the Army would be permitted to conduct such operations in the United States; however, section 4.3.2 lists psychological operations as part of Army OCONUS support.

4.2.7 Category VII: LEA Requirements for Training Support Matched to Army Capabilities and Resources

This category includes all tasks associated with providing training on police functions related to counterdrug operations or on any of the tasks in the six previous categories. In an Army unit these types of tasks would come under the staff cognizance of the G-3 training section.

For at least two reasons, training is potentially the most valuable area of Army counterdrug support. First, as with logistics and C³ support, there are few legal or policy constraints on the Army's providing training to LEAs. Because training is a primary mission for Army schools and a secondary mission for many units (for example, Special Forces), it is often fairly easy to justify a waiver from the Economy Act. Second, the LEAs, especially at state and local levels, need additional training. A 1987 FBI study of state and local LEA training needs¹⁵ examined 115 critical tasks and found that, on the average, 122,000 state and local law enforcement officers required additional training on a given task. Furthermore, the study showed that the top priority for training in three of the four LEA categories considered¹⁶ was for tasks associated with counterdrug operations. The exception was

¹⁵ *State and Local Law Enforcement Training Needs*, Institutional Research and Development Unit, Training Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Quantico, VA, December 1987.

¹⁶ The four categories of LEAs in the study were: municipal and county police agencies and sheriff's departments with 500 or more sworn personnel; municipal and county police agencies with fewer than 500 personnel; sheriff's departments with fewer than 500 personnel; and state police/highway patrol agencies.

agencies with at least 500 sworn personnel, and many of those agencies may have their own training programs.

The Army can provide training to LEAs in several ways: it can provide space in regularly scheduled courses held at an Army facility; it can customize training courses at Army facilities for LEAs; and it can form mobile training teams (MTTs) to provide training at LEA sites. For the following reasons, the MTT approach is often the most effective:

- The small state and local agencies that most need the training often cannot afford to lose their agents for the time needed to complete a training course. They also cannot afford to pay transportation and per-diem expenses.
- Conducting a course at an LEA site provides Army trainers an opportunity to learn about the environment in which their lessons will be applied. Spending time with LEA officers in an LEA operating environment can provide valuable training feedback for the trainers.

A review of the LEA requirements for training support showed that they fall into two basic categories: training in skills associated with the other six requirements areas, and training in basic police and organizational skills. Many of tables 4.1 through 4.16 include Army training capabilities and resources under the heading of Infrastructure Development Support. The U.S. Army Military Police School provided a list of relevant courses that the school can teach in either formal courses at the school or (for many courses) through MTTs. Appendix C lists those courses and their syllabus items. The items are extensive enough to cover the basic counterdrug training needs of any LEA. For these reasons, the capabilities for Army training support are not presented in a table.

4.3 OCONUS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND ARMY CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES

This section presents the findings on OCONUS support requirements and the Army capabilities and resources that match those requirements. The section first provides background information on Army counterdrug activities in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Next, the types of support currently being provided to this region are discussed and related to the requirements for Army support. Finally, information on Army capabilities and resources applicable to this area is presented.

4.3.1 Background

The Army participates in two general types of counterdrug activities in the SOUTHCOM AOR: (1) detection and monitoring of drug traffic, and (2) support for counterdrug operations and nation-building. Detection and monitoring are a joint-Service effort to decrease the flow of drugs into the United States from the drug-growing and processing countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR. SOUTHCOM headquarters, JTF-4, and JTF-5 direct

that effort.¹⁷ The principal Army role in detection and monitoring is operating sea- and land-based aerostat radars. Although some of the information obtained from those detection and monitoring efforts is shared with LEAs, the operations are under military, rather than LEA, control and are therefore not considered support to LEAs.¹⁸ Because this is not LEA support, and because the Army's role is small compared to that of the other Services, this FEA does not include OCONUS detection and monitoring.

In providing support for counterdrug operations and nation-building to countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR, the Army acts in a role similar to the one it plays in supporting LEAs in CONUS. The Country Team in the U.S. Embassy for OCONUS support is analogous to the LEA as the customer for CONUS support. The Country Team is headed by the ambassador and includes, among others, all embassy personnel assigned to any aspect of counterdrug operations. The composition of a Country Team depends on the country. In Bolivia, the team includes representatives of the U.S. Military Group (MILGROUP), the Defense Attaché's Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Representatives from each agency in the Country Team form an Operations Planning Group (OPG), which is responsible for planning and directing all U.S. counterdrug activities in the country. The OPG receives intelligence support from a Tactical Analysis Team (TAT). The TAT consists of military intelligence analysts drawn from all the Services, who coordinate the employment of military and national intelligence assets and perform data fusion, analysis, and dissemination.

The Country Team generates requests for support after negotiating with the Host Nation. The Host Nation government and the U.S. Ambassador must then approve the requests before they are sent forward. The requests go initially to the counterdrug section of the SOUTHCOM J-3 (SCJ3-DDD), which again reviews them for legality and feasibility. The Commander in Chief SOUTHCOM (CINCSOUTH) has been delegated authority to approve some types of support. Requests that do not fall within CINCSOUTH's authority are sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or SecDef level. When a request has been approved, SCJ3-DDD "shops around" to select a unit to provide the support. Section 4.4 discusses some of the results of this approval process in more detail.

Once in the Host Nation, an Army unit may support a U.S. LEA such as the DEA, support a Host-Nation military or police unit, or engage in a nation-building effort by, for example, building roads. Whatever the specific task, the unit will come under the direct control of the Country Team and, ultimately, the ambassador.

4.3.2 OCONUS Support Requirements

We were unable to survey all the SOUTHCOM Country Teams to determine their needs for Army support. Therefore, we had to look for other sources of information that would allow us to identify the types of support required. Fortunately, ODCSOPS ODD maintains a SOUTHCOM counterdrug database that contains information on all support provided in that

¹⁷ JTF-4 covers the east coast of the United States, and JTF-5 covers the west coast.

¹⁸ As stated in section 2.3, DoD has been designated the single lead agency in the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug traffic into the United States.

region from about December 1990 to June 1992. It is important to note that support provided is not necessarily the same as support requested, or indeed support required. However, our interviews at SOUTHCOM, USARSO, and the Bolivian Country Team gave no indication that significant support requirements are not being met. Therefore, we believe that information on the support provided gives a good indication of the support required.

The SOUTHCOM database contains information on 216 support missions. These missions have provided the types of support described below:

- MTT: An Army unit deploys to train Host Nation forces.
- Deployments for Training (DFTs): A U.S. unit conducts training or participates in exercises in conjunction with a Host Nation unit. The purpose of a DFT is to provide a training opportunity for both the U.S. and the Host Nation unit.
- Extended Training Service Specialist (ETSS) support : A soldier with specific critical skills is assigned to an embassy on a long-term basis to provide expertise in the development of training programs.
- Participating Agencies Support Agreement (PASA) support: A soldier is assigned to the State Department to provide critical skills or expertise in support of counterdrug operations. It is important to note that soldiers assigned to PASA are considered on duty with the State Department and do not come under the same restrictions as other military personnel participating in counterdrug operations.
- MILGROUP support: This category accounts for Army personnel assigned to billets in the embassy Military Groups.
- Tactical Analysis Team (TAT): A team of intelligence analysts provides support to the Country Team.
- Planning Assistance Team (PAT): Army personnel with staff planning expertise help U.S. LEAs and Host Nation units to plan counterdrug operations.
- Regional Counterdrug Analysis Team (RCAT): A TAT provides intelligence support to the embassies of several nations in a region.
- Assessment Team (ASMT): A team supports embassies or Host Nation forces by conducting assessments of tactical or operational situations.
- Intelligence (INTELL): Intelligence support is provided by individuals on an as-needed basis to supplement the support provided by a TAT.
- Engineer (ENGR) support: Army units provide engineer assistance either in direct support of counterdrug operations or as part of nation-building programs.
- Operations (OPS) support: This category includes a variety of support provided for specific counterdrug operations. An example is communications support.

- **Military Information Support Team (MIST):** A team provides psychological operations support.

These missions have been grouped into the seven categories already used in this report for CONUS support requirements: administrative, intelligence, operations, logistics, C³, special tasks, and training. This organization of mission types is shown below:

- **Administrative:**
Provide military group personnel.
- **Intelligence:**
Provide tactical analysis team personnel.
Provide regional counterdrug analysis team personnel.
Provide assessment team personnel.
Provide intelligence analysts.
Provide mobile training teams.
- **Operational:**
Provide support for counterdrug operations.
Provide planning assistance team personnel.
Provide participating agencies support agreement personnel.
- **Logistics:**
Provide engineer support for building or maintaining Host Nation facilities.
Provide mobile training teams.
- **Command, control, and communications:**
Provide extended training service specialist personnel.
Provide planning assistance team personnel.
Provide military group personnel.
Provide mobile training teams.
- **Special tasks:**
Provide MIST teams to conduct psychological operations.
- **Training:**
Provide mobile training teams.
Conduct deployments for training.

Note that some types of missions, such as providing military group personnel, fit more than one requirements category. This is because these types of missions can provide a variety of skills and capabilities. Section 4.3.3 discusses the requirements of the various types of missions.

Our OCONUS interviews produced some requirements information that was not found in the SOUTHCOM database. At SOUTHCOM headquarters, we were told that helicopter

training for pilots and support personnel and direct helicopter transportation support are critical in the SOUTHCOM AOR. This is because that AOR includes vast areas that do not have sophisticated road networks. (There is a similar need for helicopter support in the national forest areas of California.) The Bolivian Country Team told us that there is also an urgent need for C³I support, particularly in the areas of tactical communications, intelligence fusion, and intelligence analysis.

4.3.3 Army OCONUS Support Capabilities

Unfortunately for our purposes, the SOUTHCOM database contains only general information on the source of support. It lists, for example, SOUTHCOM, USARSO, or FORSCOM. This deficiency did not affect our analysis of the OCONUS support requirements, but it did affect the analysis of Army support capabilities. First, the data did not identify support provided specifically by the Army. Second, because the data did not identify the unit providing support for a mission, we could not identify the capability or resource provided. For example, providing personnel for a military group could satisfy any of several requirements; the capability provided depends on the particular requirement.

We therefore cannot claim that the discussion of OCONUS support in this section reflects only Army capabilities. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the data do represent Army capabilities: (1) SCJ3-DDD stated that the Army provides most of the Host Nation support, and (2) with only a few exceptions, the Army possesses the skills required by the types of support being provided.

For some of the support missions, it was possible to determine, at least in general terms, the capability employed. These general capabilities and the mission types associated with them are shown below.

Capability Provided	Mission Type
Psychological operations training or support	DFT, MIST
Intelligence training or intelligence analysis support	MTT, TAT, RCAT, INTELL
Infantry training	MTT, DFT
Planning support	PAT
Maintenance or supply training	MTT
Helicopter operations training	MTT
Special operations training	DFT
Engineer support	ENGR

Interviews at SOUTHCOM headquarters, USARSO, and the Bolivian Country Team provided comments about Army support in the SOUTHCOM AOR that augmented the information extracted from the database:

- The Army should develop a better method of tracking soldiers with linguistic skills. Many support missions require linguistic skills less than those of formally trained or native linguists. For example, an MTT member needs to be able to communicate to some limited degree in the Host Nation language. Currently, the Army can track linguistic skills only for those whose service records contain the results of formal language tests.
- To learn to identify information required to build a prosecutable case, intelligence analysts selected for assignment to counterdrug support in this AOR should take the two-week intelligence seminar course conducted at Quantico by the DEA.
- LEA field agents feel strongly that classification of information by the DoD creates problems between LEAs and the Services. We were told of cases in which someone in DoD classified information originally developed by an LEA agent, making the information unreleasable to other LEAs. Interviewees suggested that DoD create a new level of classification called, for example, "Law Enforcement Sensitive." This level could ensure appropriate protection of information, while allowing sharing of the information between LEAs.

The data and information presented above are suitable for making broad generalizations about needed capabilities; they should not be used to identify specific Army capabilities or resources. Therefore, we have not been able to provide task-capabilities matrices such as we did for CONUS capabilities and requirements.

4.4 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Two sources provided the findings in this section. The first source is comments made by LEA officials, active and reserve military personnel, and National Guard personnel during interviews. All of these personnel are currently participating in counterdrug activities either in CONUS or OCONUS. The presentation of each issue derived from this source represents our interpretation of comments from multiple interviewees. Wherever possible, we include direct quotations. Because of our promise that we would not attribute interview comments to identified individuals, this report does not cite sources for the quotations. The second source for these additional findings is our observations made during the analysis and during previous counterdrug studies conducted for ODCSOPS.

This section contains CONUS and OCONUS sections, and each of these is divided into general categories of issues.

4.4.1 Additional Findings (CONUS)

4.4.1.1 The Need for Army Support

Almost all the LEA officials we spoke with stated that the LEAs are being overwhelmed by the drug traffickers. In the words of one agent, they are "out-manned, out-gunned, and out-spent." This situation exists because of the extraordinary amount of money available to the traffickers. Several officials told us that, because of the quantities involved, they often weigh, rather than count, seized drug money. Many LEA agents see their role as trying to hold back the flood of drugs until other efforts succeed in reducing the demand or eliminating the sources of supply. Practically every official we spoke to indicated eagerness for military support to help close the gap between themselves and the traffickers. Although many of those officials had experienced frustration and disappointment in dealing with the military¹⁹, their needs for help are so great that they are willing to try anything to get the support they require.

Smaller LEAs often do not take advantage of military support because they do not know what support is available or how to request it. These agencies, with their inadequate budgets and resources, are often the ones that could benefit the most from Army support. Several officials recommended that the military develop a better program to help educate the smaller LEAs.

"The greatest resources are probably military people who have been working with LEAs." A Florida LEA agent made this comment, which was based on his experience incorporating Florida Army National Guard (ANG) personnel into multi-agency LEAs. A number of officials interviewed said that Army personnel assigned to support LEAs do not always spend enough time with the LEA to learn the job well enough to be effective. Army personnel assigned to an LEA for fewer than 30 days must often leave just as they are starting to make a contribution. Conversely, agencies that had Army or National Guard personnel assigned on a long-term basis (60 to 90 days) were enthusiastic about the support they were receiving. Thus, there appears to be a need for on-the-job training that in many cases can only be obtained by assigning personnel for longer periods.

Currently, DoD policy constrains the regular Army from assigning individuals for long-term service with LEAs (DoD order 1000.17 identifies the few exceptions to that policy). On the other hand, the National Guard does have the authority to assign personnel to LEAs for longer periods. An example of how longer assignments can be effective is Operation Wildfire, a multi-agency task force in southern Florida. Officials we spoke with there had high praise for the contributions of the 12 National Guard soldiers assigned full-time to the task force. The principal constraint on the National Guard in providing this type of support is the availability of funds.

¹⁹ Two causes of frustration with military support were mentioned most frequently: a lack of familiarity on the part of the military with the LEA's environment and problems, and a perceived lack of responsiveness to LEA requests. Both of these problems are discussed later in this section.

The Army can help to improve cooperation between LEAs. For example, the Army National Guard (ANG) in Florida has helped to solve the problem of information-sharing between agencies. Often, LEAs are reluctant to share information among themselves for fear of losing credit for an arrest or, what is more important, losing the proceeds from property seizures associated with the arrest. This lack of cooperation is understandable, considering that most civilian LEAs receive funding and other benefits based largely on their "numbers": the "busts" (arrests, seizures) made during a specific period. The LEAs see the Florida ANG as an honest broker who will ensure that information is passed to the agencies that need it and that credit is shared equitably.

4.4.1.2 "Cultural" Differences Between the Army and the LEAs

Both LEA and military respondents frequently described the Army and the LEAs as belonging to two separate cultures. We were told numerous stories in which differences in language, training, attitude, or orientation between an LEA and a military unit led to misunderstandings, confusion, and, in some cases, near disaster. In one instance, a police official told a squad of Marines to "cover me." The squad responded by firing 71 rounds into a suspect's house. This response is appropriate for the type of urban warfare the Marines trained for, but it was definitely not what the police official had in mind. The Army's mission is to defend our country by destroying its enemies, whereas the LEAs defend society by enforcing the law and arresting criminals. An Army official summed up the difference in attitudes that results from these different missions: "The ethos of the infantry platoon does not presume innocence."

The need for "cross-cultural" education for Army and LEA personnel before conducting counterdrug operations is therefore critical. An example of such education is the counterdrug training course run by the California National Guard at the National Interagency Counter Drug Institute (NICI) in California. The NICI course brings together representatives from LEAs, the military Services, and the judicial system for a week of briefings on topics such as the roles and missions of the federal counterdrug agencies and legal considerations in employing the military in counterdrug support. The week culminates in a wargame in which class members play the roles of participants in a counterdrug operation. This type of program fosters understanding across cultural boundaries and should lead to increased cooperation between the military and LEAs.

4.4.1.3 Process for Providing Support

Before the publication of the DoD counterdrug plan in 1989, there was no established process for approving requests for military counterdrug support. A process has since evolved in an ad hoc manner, but there are still no established guidelines for prioritizing support requests or evaluating the effectiveness of resources applied.²⁰ The principal considerations in responding to a request for personnel support are legal and fiscal. Typically, requests are

²⁰ Ways to measure the effectiveness of Army counterdrug support were examined in two MITRE documents: "Preliminary Report on the Development of Measures for Evaluation of Army Counter-Drug Support", MITRE Corporation, WP92W000067, Washington D.C., February 1992, and a MITRE White Paper, "Data Collection Processes to Support Analysis of the Effectiveness of Army Support to Counter-Drug Operations", forwarded as MITRE letter W113-L-020, dated 21 January 1992.

considered on a first-come, first-served basis; prioritization, if done at all, is done at the level of an action officer. There are at least two drawbacks to this approach: it does not support the most effective use of resources, and it does not consider the possibility of demand (support requests) exceeding supply (military resources).²¹

The same situation exists for equipment loan requests. We were told that each of the four Regional Logistics Support Officers (RLSOs) prioritizes regional requests on an ad-hoc basis, and that there is no system for prioritizing requests between regions.

It can take as long as three months for the Army or an RLSO to respond favorably to a request for support. Many LEAs consider this time to be far too long to be effective. A common comment was that LEA planning cycles are much shorter than the military's. LEAs often cannot identify their equipment needs in advance. We were also told that the Army is the only Service that requires a surety bond from the borrowing agency for leased equipment.

JTF-6 acts as a clearinghouse for all counterdrug support requests in the Southwest HIDTA. Any request that cannot be filled by the National Guards in the Southwest HIDTA states is referred to JTF-6 for approval and assignment to a unit from one of the Services. Although JTF-6 does not have direct tasking authority, it has access to military units in the entire CONUS. Outside the Southwest HIDTA, the counterdrug cells in the six CONUSA headquarters perform the same role as JTF-6. Thus there may be as many as seven agencies "shopping around" for military units to fill support requests at any given time. We received a number of comments suggesting that it would be more efficient, and less confusing to the LEAs, if there were a single national point of contact for matching LEA support requests to available military resources.

4.4.1.4 LEA Preferences for National Guard Support

The LEA officials we spoke with agreed almost unanimously that their preferred source of military support was state National Guards. There are several reasons for this:

- Because it is a state agency and, therefore, not subject to the same restrictions as the Regular Army, the National Guard has fewer legal restrictions on its ability to support law enforcement. (See the discussion in section 4.4.1.5.)
- The National Guard, at least in the areas we visited, is able to react more quickly to requests than the regular component is.
- National Guard personnel are more familiar with the environment and the people in the area in which they operate, because it is often the area in which they live.

For these reasons, many of the officials we talked to saw the principal role of the Regular Army as supporting or augmenting state Guards. These officials stressed that the Regular Army must become more responsive and better prepared if Army support is to be effective.

²¹ Since the advent of military support to the drug war, the number of support requests has increased each year. Comments from the LEAs indicate that this trend is likely to continue.

These LEA officials realize that the Guard cannot provide all the support they need. Each state organizes its Guard differently; the Guard's ability to provide support depends on the particular Guard's amounts and types of personnel and equipment. Furthermore, budget constraints often limit a Guard's ability to provide support. Severe cutbacks in many state budgets are reducing the abilities of their Guards to provide all the support being requested. Lt. Jerry Schmiedeke of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (who agreed to be quoted) wrote, "enhanced funding/support for the National Guard may be the most effective way to provide support [to LEAs]".

4.4.1.5 Constraints and Restrictions on Support

Federal and state laws limit the types of capabilities that the military can provide. Lt. Schmiedeke states that the Services should "encourage a more liberal interpretation of law and policy and a spirit of cooperation by military attorneys. Law enforcement is an inherently risky business at all levels. The government will always be liable for something." The principal legal and policy constraints on Army counterdrug support to LEAs are discussed briefly below:

- The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the Army from engaging in civil law enforcement activities in CONUS (By policy , this restriction is also applied OCONUS). The Army therefore may not conduct searches, seizures, or apprehensions of non-military personnel. There are many questions about the amount and types of support the Army can provide without violating Posse Comitatus. It is primarily Posse Comitatus to which Lt. Schmiedeke's remarks above refer.
- The Economy Act prohibits the Army from providing free goods and services to other agencies. The Army must therefore be paid for any support it provides to LEAs. As discussed in section 4.2, the Army can obtain waivers from the Economy Act when it can show that the Army will receive sufficient training value to compensate for the costs involved.
- Executive Order (EO) 12333 restricts the use of military intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel in supporting law enforcement. This order, combined with interpretations of Posse Comitatus that prohibit the Army from collecting or possessing information on civilians has limited the support the Army can provide for LEA intelligence collection and management. As a result of EO 12333, all support requests that may involve use of military intelligence or counter-intelligence personnel must be reviewed and approved at the SecDef level. This requirement significantly increases the amount of time required to act on a request.
- The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Army personnel in the conduct of their duties from entering private land without written consent from the landowner. This prohibition severely limits the Army's ability to support LEAs in searches for, and seizure or destruction of, drug cultivation and production facilities.

A critical point about the restrictions listed above is that they do not apply to the National Guard operating under state control.

Concern over the legality of Army counterdrug support has resulted in approval authority for support being held at a very high level. The lowest level at which a support request can be approved in CONUS is Commander in Chief FORSCOM (CINCFOR). Even at this level, the types of support that can be approved are limited to support specifically authorized by JCS's Delegation of Authority. All other support requests must be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or, for some types of support (for example, military intelligence), to SecDef. Each level in the approval chain requires a staff analysis to determine whether to approve or disapprove a request, or forward it to the next higher headquarters. The result is a significant reduction in timeliness.

4.4.2 Additional Findings (OCONUS)

4.4.2.1 The Need for Ongoing Army Support

Members of the Bolivian Country Team echoed the comments of their CONUS counterparts on the need to assign military personnel to counterdrug support tasks on a long-term (90 days or more) basis to allow time to "learn the ropes." They stressed that it would be helpful if personnel assigned to support a Country Team could get some training and preparation before arrival, so they could make better use of their time in country. Some of the areas in which preparation could be helpful include:

- Environment (terrain; health and sanitation; culture; etc.),
- Rules of Engagement (ROE),²² and
- Differences between military and LEA cultures.

In one form or another, almost everyone we spoke to in the Embassy emphasized the need to prepare personnel better before arrival in the AOR.

4.4.2.2 Process for Providing Support

Because of political issues discussed in more detail below, there is a problem in getting support requests approved in SOUTHCOM that is similar to the problem in CONUS. The Commander in Chief SOUTHCOM (CINCSOUTH) is the lowest level that can approve support. Many types of OCONUS support must be approved at the SecDef level; this requirement significantly affects support timeliness.

We were told that the foreign military sales program is not effective in providing equipment to Host Nations. The equipment often spends months in the pipeline and sometimes arrives too late to be useful.

²² They must understand that they are there to support the LEA, and that they come under control of the embassy.

4.4.2.3 Constraints and Restrictions on Support

The principal factor affecting Army support in SOUTHCOM is international policy. The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for the activities of all U.S. personnel in the country, and political concerns usually drive his decisions. He must ensure that U.S. personnel take no actions in violation of a treaty or agreement or the ambassador's guidance from the President or the Secretary of State. Most significantly, he can take no action without the approval of the government of the Host Nation. For the following reasons, obtaining Host Nation approval for counterdrug actions, particularly those involving military support, is often difficult:

- Many in the Host Nation believe that the presence of U.S. military personnel in an operational status mposes on a nation's sovereignty. The drug traffickers recognize that belief, and they continually conduct psychological operations to convince the populace that the United States is planning to overthrow their government. A campaign in Bolivia convinced some that U.S. Army engineers who were building schools and clinics in rural areas were instead constructing dumps for nuclear waste.
- Many Latin American governments are suspicious of their own military forces. They fear that a strong military force will attempt a coup. Since much U.S. counterdrug support consists of training foreign military units, the Host Nation government sometimes believes that support increases the internal military threat. In Bolivia, the Army trained two infantry battalions in basic tactical skills only to find that these battalions were never employed. This may have occurred because of government fears that the battalions would become too effective.

SECTION 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section consists of two parts. Section 5.1 presents our conclusions and recommendations, where applicable, based on the findings in section 4. Section 5.2 discusses several other issues that arose during the FEA. The purpose of section 5.2 is to provide insights that may be useful in future studies of Army counterdrug support.

5.1 FEA CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1.1 Conclusions

- The list of LEA CONUS counterdrug tasks presented in section 4.2 is representative of the needs of the LEAs. As such, it can support planning and follow-on studies for future Army counterdrug support.
- The lists of Army capabilities and resources presented in section 4.2 are an accurate representation of the types of support the Army can provide to CONUS LEAs.
- The Army has the capabilities and resources to support most types of requirements of CONUS LEAs. Section 4.2 identified five tasks that Army capabilities do not support, but these tasks do not appear to have a major impact on LEA counterdrug operations.
- In some areas—for example, Logistics and C³—the Army has capabilities and resources that can support tasks that the FEA did not identify. LEAs may nonetheless perform some of those tasks.
- Larger LEAs, such as the DEA and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, are familiar with the Army's counterdrug capabilities, but many smaller LEAs are not aware of the available Army support and the ways to obtain that support.
- The OCONUS support requirements and Army capabilities and resources presented in section 4.3 are representative of support needs in the SOUTHCOM AOR and the Army's capabilities for meeting those needs. However, the requirements and capabilities are not at the same level of detail as the corresponding findings for CONUS and cannot support follow-on studies to the same degree as the CONUS findings.

- The FEA's scope did not include: (1) prioritizing the LEA or Country Team requirements, or (2) assessing the relative effectiveness of Army support that could meet those requirements. Additional studies will be needed to accomplish these tasks if the Army wishes to:
 - Conduct long-range planning for doctrine, organization, training, leader development and materiel acquisition.
 - Develop procedures for allocating Army resources to achieve the greatest impact on the national counterdrug goals.
 - Develop procedures for determining which requests to support if the demand for support exceeds the available resources.

5.1.2 Recommendations

- The list of LEA support tasks presented in section 4.2 and appendix B should be used as a basis for future studies on the Army role in the drug war.
- The Army capabilities and resources presented in section 4.2 should be used as a basis for future studies on Army counterdrug support in CONUS.
- As discussed in section 4.2, the Army should take a more pro-active approach to informing smaller LEAs about Army counterdrug capabilities and resources. One possibility is for NICI to reach a larger audience by using MTTs.
- The Army should collect additional data to determine more completely the support requirements in the SOUTHCOM AOR and to match Army capabilities and resources to those requirements. That data would support the types of additional study efforts discussed above in the conclusions. The data could be collected by personal interviews, mail or telephone surveys, or a combination of interviews and surveys. Furthermore, the Army should consider expanding the data collection beyond the SOUTHCOM AOR to ensure including all the OCONUS support requirements.
- The Army should conduct a follow-on study, based on the findings of the FEA, to prioritize LEA and Country Team requirements and to determine the relative effectiveness of Army support capabilities and resources. This study should take the form of a cost-benefit analysis. Some data on priorities were collected during this FEA.

5.2 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Service responses to requests for support frustrate many LEA officials. There are two major problems with the current process: (1) support is often not provided as quickly as it is needed, and (2) military personnel often do not know or understand the unique needs of LEAs, the LEA culture, and the environment in which the LEAs operate. Although this is a

joint-Service issue, the Army has an opportunity to take the lead, together with the law enforcement community, to develop innovative approaches for improving the quality of support provided to CONUS LEAs. In our discussions with members of the military and LEA communities, we heard a number of recommendations for changes to the current support process. To illustrate the types of approaches the Army may wish to investigate, we discuss four of the most frequent recommendations:

- One cause of slow responses to LEA support requests is the high levels at which many requests must be approved. At each level of authority the commander's staff must review the support request, after which the commander decides whether to approve, disapprove, or pass the request to the next higher headquarters. This is obviously a time-consuming process. One solution for this problem is to delegate approval authority to the lowest level possible for as many types of support as possible. Since this problem is caused by concerns about legal ramifications, a key to implementing this solution would be to develop ways to ensure that the law is not violated and to protect members of the military from criminal liability. The effects of the legal restrictions on the military are discussed in more detail below.
- In the states we visited, the National Guard is the preferred source of support for LEAs because of the Guard's more timely responses, its better understanding of the LEA and local environments, and the relative lack of restrictions on Guard employment. The state Guards, however, cannot provide all the amounts and types of support needed. The principal limitations on the Guard are funding and the lack of a full set of counterdrug support capabilities within a given state. Two alternatives that should be examined are (1) increase the funding of the state Guards to allow them to fully meet more of the requirements of the LEAs in their states, and (2) assign active Army units on a permanent or long-term basis to augment the capabilities of the Army National Guard in each state requiring support. The second alternative (a "reverse round-out") is the mirror image of the current process that has Guard units assigned to augment active Army units in wartime ("round-out"). Assigning active units to specific states would allow developing relationships and procedures between the Army and the supported LEAs that should improve both the responsiveness and the effectiveness of Army support. Implementing this alternative would first require investigating and resolving the legal implications of mixing state and federal troops on counterdrug support missions.
- Some military personnel we interviewed suggested that the active Army form a dedicated counterdrug brigade. This approach would (1) improve responsiveness because the unit would be preassigned to provide counterdrug support, (2) improve effectiveness because the unit would train and prepare specifically for counterdrug support operations, and (3) develop better relations with the LEAs because of long-term interactions between the same groups of persons. The brigade would consist of units and persons selected to have the capabilities and resources identified in this FEA and later studies as needed for effective counterdrug support. One way to create this brigade, while minimizing the impact on the rest of the Army, would be to form a permanent command group and then rotate operating and support units into and out of the brigade on, say, a six- to twelve-month basis. This concept is similar to that

used by the U.S. Marine Corps in forming Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).

- One way to decrease confusion and improve planning and effective use of resources would be to establish a national point-of-contact for all counterdrug support requests. For example, JTF-6's area of responsibility could be expanded from the southwest border to all of CONUS. Similarly, a central point-of-contact could be established for equipment requests. That contact would be responsible for establishing support priorities and for coordinating the efforts of the RLSOs.

Investigation of alternatives for improving counterdrug support to LEAs could be done from an Army or joint-Service perspective. We believe that this investigation should take the form of a business re-engineering study, with the objective of determining how the Services, or the Army in particular, can best organize to provide the most responsive and effective support possible to LEAs.

As discussed above, concerns about violating the law and about potential criminal liability cause much of the perceived lack of military responsiveness to counterdrug support requests. No one we spoke with, whether military or civilian, advocated major changes to Posse Comitatus or other laws that restrict the Services' roles in law enforcement. There was a consensus that too-conservative interpretations of the law have resulted in policies that place unnecessary restrictions on the Services' abilities to provide effective support. There is a perception among many in the LEA community that the Services' approach to setting policies for counterdrug support is oriented more toward risk avoidance than toward mission accomplishment. This perception has led to a widely-held belief that, despite pronouncements to the contrary, the military has not fully committed to the war on drugs. Again, this is a joint-Service issue in which the Army has an opportunity to assume a leading role by conducting a legal review of all policies within DoD relating to the provision of counterdrug support. The objective of this review would be to ensure that DoD's policies are as pro-active as possible, while still providing appropriate legal guidelines and safeguards.

APPENDIX A

ANALYSIS PARTICIPANTS

This appendix lists the civilian and military agencies visited in the conduct of the Front End Analysis. The order of the list is same as the order of the visits.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, PA

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, DC

Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley AFB, VA

FBI Academy
Quantico, VA

American Prosecutors Research Institute
Alexandria, VA

Army National Guard
Washington, DC

Headquarters, Florida National Guard
St. Augustine, FL

Broward County Sheriff's Department
Fort Lauderdale, FL

Drug Enforcement Agency Regional Office
Fort Lauderdale, FL

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (Task Force Wildfire)
Miami, FL

U.S. Customs Service (Operation Blue Lightning)
Miami, FL

Regional Logistics Support Office
Miami, FL

Joint Task Force-4
Key West, FL

•
Headquarters, California National Guard
Mather AFB, CA

•
Bureau of Land Management
Sacramento, CA

6th U.S. Army
Presidio, San Francisco, CA

Joint Task Force-5
Oakland, CA

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
Los Angeles, CA

Los Angeles Interagency
Metropolitan Police
Apprehension Crime Task Force
Los Angeles, CA

U.S. Army Signal School
Fort Gordon, GA

2nd U.S. Army Headquarters
Fort Gillem, GA

FORSCOM Headquarters
Fort McPherson, GA

U.S. Army Military Police School
Fort McClellan, AL

U.S. Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, GA

Ranger Training Brigade
Fort Benning, GA

U.S. Army Aviation School
Fort Rucker, AL

U.S. Army Intelligence Center
Fort Huachuca, AZ

•
SOUTHCOM Headquarters
Panama City, Panama
•

•
United States Army South (USARSO) Headquarters
Panama City, Panama

•
U.S. Embassy
La Paz, Bolivia

APPENDIX B

CONUS LEA TASKS

MITRE developed a list of CONUS LEA counterdrug tasks by using data from the studies referenced in section 3, augmented by information from personal interviews and from worksheets filled out by LEA personnel. This appendix presents the tasks organized by requirements category.

More than a hundred law enforcement agents at the federal, state, and local levels reviewed the tasks listed below for accuracy and completeness. MITRE believes that the list includes most of the counterdrug tasks performed by CONUS law enforcement personnel.

Category I: LEA Requirements for Administrative Support

Administrative support can increase the efficiency of LEAs by freeing sworn agents to perform their primary mission. The LEA analysis participants identified the following administrative tasks:

- Preparing, storing, and distributing reports;
- Preparing testimony;
- Establishing and maintaining a chain of custody for evidence;
- Maintaining LEA personnel records;
- Maintaining LEA financial records;
- Preparing and maintaining statistical records;
- Preparing and maintaining budgets, grant applications, and other financial documents;
- Establishing and maintaining a correspondence system;
- Conducting background investigations on job applicants;
- General office administration.

Category II: LEA Requirements for Intelligence Support

LEAs require support in collecting intelligence information from the sources listed below:

- Informants and cooperating witnesses;
- Imaging devices and other sensors;
- Seized or public records;
- Interrogations of suspects;
- Undercover operations;
- Aerial imagery;
- LEA databases;
- Ground searches;
- Aerial searches;
- Field notes;
- Field tests of controlled substances;

- Forensic analyses;
- Communication intercepts (wired and wireless);
- Translations of documents, interviews, and wiretap information;
- Surveillance videos and photographs.

LEAs also require support for a variety of tasks associated with the analysis, management, and dissemination of intelligence information:

- Analyzing information (threat assessments, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, etc.);
- Storing collected information (building or maintaining files or databases);
- Updating information;
- Exchanging information with other agencies;
- Ensuring the security of information;
- Distributing information.

Category III: LEA Requirements for Operational Support

LEAs require support in planning and conducting counterdrug operations. Operational tasks requiring support are the following:

- Planning (long- and short-term)
- Direct operations such as:
 - Identifying suspects;
 - Identifying targets;
 - Conducting searches;
 - Conducting undercover operations;
 - Conducting financial investigations to seize illegal funds;
 - Destroying, eradicating, or seizing drug cultivation facilities;
 - Destroying or seizing drug production facilities;
 - Conducting security operations (for example, protection of witnesses, courtroom security);
 - Conducting air or ground deterrence operations (“show of force”);
 - Conducting stationary or mobile surveillance of drug suspects, sites, or vehicles;
 - Driving vehicle in emergency or pursuit situations;
 - Employing special weapons (for example, sniper rifles, riot control equipment);
 - Conducting underwater search and recovery operations;
 - Making arrests;
 - Seizing contraband;
 - Conducting SWAT operations.

- Supporting operations such as:
 - Prosecuting offenders,
 - Operating facilities for the incarceration of offenders,
 - Performing chemical decontamination of drug laboratory sites,
 - Restoring eradicated drug-growing areas.

Category IV: LEA Requirements for Logistics Support

Most LEAs have inadequate logistical resources. Tasks where logistics support may achieve significant improvements in effectiveness are the following:

- Transporting agents to and from operational sites;
- Securing and transporting suspects, contraband, seized equipment, and funds;
- Providing medical support for operations;
- Storing and maintaining LEA vehicles, aircraft, or vessels;
- Storing and maintaining LEA weapons and equipment;
- Constructing, upgrading, or maintaining LEA facilities;
- Providing canine support for searches and other tasks;
- Acquiring supplies and equipment.

Category V: LEA Requirements for Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Support

Because of the large number and variety of local, state and federal LEAs, communication and coordination between agencies is often a problem. Tasks for which C³ support can improve LEA efficiency are the following:

- Communications planning within an agency,
- Communications planning with other agencies,
- Preparing operational plans,
- Coordinating plans and actions,
- Establishing and maintaining operational communications,
- Ensuring communications security (including countermeasures).

Category VI: LEA Requirements for Support of Special Tasks

Some important support requirements do not fit into any of the preceding categories. These specialized tasks are the following:

- Providing public relations support for operations,
- Providing legal assistance support for operations,
- Providing drug abuse education and prevention support to the public.

Category VII: LEA Requirements for Training Support

Many LEAs have inadequate training resources and budgets. Helping LEAs to improve the training level of their personnel can significantly increase LEA effectiveness. Tasks for which LEAs require training support are the following:

- Conduct training in administrative tasks (see category I above),
- Conduct training in information collection (see category II above),
- Conduct training in operational tasks (see category III above),
- Conduct training in logistics support tasks (see category IV above),
- Conduct training in communications and coordination tasks (see category V above),
- Conduct training in special tasks (see category VI above),
- Conduct training in basic police procedures,
- Conduct training in management (counseling, organization, etc.),
- Conduct weapons training,
- Conduct training in physical fitness (establish physical training programs),
- Conduct training in instructor development.

APPENDIX C

TRAINING RESOURCES OF THE U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL

This appendix lists counterdrug syllabus items in which the U.S. Army Military Police School offers instruction. The items are taken from the course descriptions of formal courses taught at the school or, optionally for some courses, at an LEA's site (MTTs). The school can also tailor courses for the specific needs of an LEA by choosing items from the lists given below.

The nine courses for which this appendix lists syllabus items are:

1. Counterdrug Investigations,
2. Counterdrug Special Weapons and Tactics,
3. Counterdrug Field Tactical Police Operations,
4. Counterdrug Narco-Terrorism Personal Protection,
5. Counterdrug Commanders,
6. Counterdrug Marksman/Observer,
7. Counterdrug Drug Demand Reduction Program,
8. Counterdrug Rehabilitation Training Instructor,
9. Counterdrug Criminal Intelligence Systems.

COUNTERDRUG INVESTIGATIONS

This 40-hour course covers covert drug investigations, with emphasis on risk management, officer safety, and practical applications. The course is usually taught at the sponsor's site. Syllabus items are the following:

- Drug Identification and Field Testing.
- Source Recruitment, Handling, and Control.
- Undercover Operations (The Undercover (UC) Officer).
- Drug Criminal Intelligence Systems.
- Drug Investigative Techniques and Drug Buy Practical Exercises.
- Use of Technical Equipment in Support of Drug Investigations.
- Clandestine Laboratories.
- Interviews and Interrogations of Drug Suspects
- Risk Management.
- Surveillance Operations.
- State Drug Laws (using a guest speaker).
- Undercover Violence.
- Raid Planning and Practical Exercises.

COUNTERDRUG SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS

This 50.5-hour course covers tactical drug raids, with emphasis on special weapons and tactics (SWAT). The course is usually taught at the sponsor's site. Syllabus items are the following:

- SWAT Concepts.
- SWAT Equipment.
- Raid Preplanning, Intelligence, and Blueprints.
- Effects of Fired Rounds.
- Use of Chemical Agents.
- Dynamic Clearing with Diversion Devices.
- Movement in Urban Terrain.
- Building Entry Techniques.
- Deliberate Building Clearing.
- Pistol/Submachine Gun/Shotgun Stress.
- Night Drug Raid Practical Exercise.
- Day Drug Raid Practical Exercise.

COUNTERDRUG FIELD TACTICAL POLICE OPERATIONS

This 40-hour course covers the practical and technical aspects of planning and conducting operations to eradicate marijuana. The emphasis is on identifying cultivators and gathering evidence to convict them. The course is usually taught at the sponsor's site. Syllabus items are the following:

- Criminal/Tactical Intelligence.
- Police Field Communications.
- Improvised Explosive Devices and Woodland Booby Traps.
- Risk Management.
- Map Reading and Use of a Compass.
- Land Navigation and Practical Exercise.
- Woodland Tactical Police Patrol Techniques.
- Marijuana Raid Planning and Practical Exercise.

COUNTERDRUG NARCO-TERRORISM PERSONAL PROTECTION

This 40-hour course covers executive and witness protective services that apply to the counterdrug field. The emphases are on protecting public officials, witnesses, and others in a narco-terrorism environment. Syllabus items are the following:

- Introduction.
- Special Weapons and Equipment.
- Unarmed Self Defense.
- Walking Formations.
- Mounted/Dismounted Formations.

- Attack Recognition/Surveillance Detection.
- Dignitary/Witness Protection in a Narco-Terrorism Environment.
- Improvised Explosive Devices.
- Vehicle and Building Searches.
- Motorcade Operations and Driving.
- Advances.
- Narco-Terrorism Threat Assessments.

COUNTERDRUG COMMANDERS

This 36-hour course trains Drug Task Force Commanders, Drug Enforcement Supervisors, Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs, and other law enforcement supervisors. Syllabus items are the following:

- Leadership and Decision Making.
- Long- and Short-Term Planning of Counterdrug Operations.
- Supervision of Undercover Drug Operations.
- Supervision of Drug-Related Intelligence Systems.
- Supervision of Tactical Police Teams.
- Risk Management.
- Multi-Dimensional Demand-Reduction Programs.

COUNTERDRUG MARKSMAN/OBSERVER

This 38-hour course teaches techniques required to safely enter and move through hostile facilities. Syllabus items are the following:

- Situational Shooting.
- Planning Tactical Operations.
- Night Shooting.
- Tactical Neutralization.
- Synchronized Shooting.
- Night Shooting Exercise.
- Movement in Urban Terrain.
- Shooting Scenarios 1, 2, and 3.
- Basic Rappelling.
- Negotiation of Obstacles/Confidence Course.
- Shooting Positions/Dry Fire.

COUNTERDRUG DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM

This 40-hour course provides demand-reduction program training for community leaders such as civilian drug enforcement personnel, criminal justice administrators, city and town administrators, educators, and church leaders. The course is based on the U.S. Army

Community Demand Reduction model. The course is usually taught at the sponsor's site. Syllabus items are the following:

- Drug Use Overview.
- Drug Use as a Social Problem.
- Drug Enforcement Efforts.
- Drug Identification and Effects.
- Drug Demand Operational Planning.
- Drug Demand Program Structure and Administration.
- Social Abuses Treatment Program.
- Drug Regulations—Federal, State, and Local.

COUNTERDRUG REHABILITATION TRAINING INSTRUCTOR

This 100-hour course teaches military disciplinary techniques and corrections principles. The emphasis is on preparing corrections officers to establish and conduct boot-camp type programs for nonviolent youthful offenders. Syllabus items are the following:

- Professional Sensitivity and Awareness.
- Counseling Techniques.
- Physical Fitness Development Training.
- Instructional Methods and Techniques.
- Drill, Formations, and Commands.
- Leader Development and Assessment.

COUNTERDRUG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

This 40-hour course provides training in counterdrug criminal intelligence systems to federal, state, and local agencies with drug enforcement missions. The emphases are on link analysis, associated matrixes, and other intelligence analysis methods. The course is usually taught at the sponsor's site. Syllabus items are the following:

- Collection of Criminal Intelligence.
- Evaluation of Criminal Intelligence.
- Collation of Criminal Intelligence.
- Analysis of Criminal Intelligence.
- Dissemination of Criminal Intelligence.
- Developing a Criminal Intelligence Database in an Automated System.
- Integrating Criminal Intelligence into the Investigative Process.

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS

ANG	Army National Guard
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASMT	Assessment Teams
C ²	Command and Control
C ³	Command, Control, and Communications
C ³ I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CAC	Combined Arms Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCFOR	Commander in Chief, FORSCOM
CINC SOUTH	Commander in Chief, SOUTHCOM
CONUS	Continental United States
CT	Country Team
DARE	Project for Drug Abuse Resistance Education
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFT	Deployment for Training
DoD	Department of Defense
ENGR	Engineer
EO	Executive Order
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Detonation
ETSS	Extended Training Service Specialist
FEA	Front End Analysis
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FORSCOM	Forces Command
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
INTELL	Intelligence
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LICPD	Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate
LP	Listening Post
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MILGROUP	United States Military Group
MIST	Military Information Support Team
MP	Military Police

ACRONYMS

MTT	Mobile Training Team
NICI	National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NNICC	National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
ODD	Current Operations, Drug
OP	Observation Post
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OPS	Operations
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PASA	Participating Agencies Support Agreement
PAT	Planning Assistance Team
PS	Protective Service
RCAT	Regional Counterdrug Analysis Team
RD&A	Research, Development, and Acquisition
RLSO	Regional Logistics Support Officer
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SP	Security Post
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TAT	Tactical Analysis Team
UC	Undercover
USARSO	United States Army South
VTC	Video Teleconference